Founder CEOs and Initial Public Offerings: The Role of Narratives, Institutions and Cultural Context by Tupper, Christina Helen
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Management Theses & Dissertations Department of Management
Summer 2016
Founder CEOs and Initial Public Offerings: The
Role of Narratives, Institutions and Cultural
Context
Christina Helen Tupper
Old Dominion University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/management_etds
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Entrepreneurial
and Small Business Operations Commons, and the International Business Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Management at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Management Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tupper, Christina H.. "Founder CEOs and Initial Public Offerings: The Role of Narratives, Institutions and Cultural Context" (2016).
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, , Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/9df1-a091
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/management_etds/2
    
 
FOUNDER CEOS AND INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: THE ROLE OF 
NARRATIVES, INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 
by 
 
Christina Helen Tupper 
B.S. May 2009, Louisiana Tech University 
MBA August 2010, Jacksonville State University 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of  
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
MANAGEMENT 
 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
August 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
William Q. Judge (Chair) 
 
Jing Zhang (Member) 
 
Ryan L. Klinger (Member) 
 
Mohammad Najand (Member) 
    
 
ABSTRACT 
 
FOUNDER CEOS AND INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: THE ROLE OF 
NARRATIVES, INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 
 
Christina Helen Tupper 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Chair: Dr. William Q. Judge 
 
 
This is a two essay dissertation which explores how founder and non-founder CEOs 
influence the IPO process and seeks to better understand their impact on IPO performance in a 
cross-national set of firms. Essay 1 addresses the question ‘how founder and non-founder CEOs’ 
narratives are portrayed differently in business media.’ Using insights from the narrative 
paradigm and utilizing qualitative content analysis for 1,057 units of data, I find that founders 
and non-founders’ media narratives differ in three important ways based on the amount of 
personal information about founders, how founders talk about their business operations, and 
positive and negative name association.  
Essay 2 addresses the related question of ‘how does national context influence the 
relationship between founder CEO presence and IPO long-run performance across multiple 
nations?’ Using insights from upper echelon theory and utilizing hierarchical linear modeling to 
analyze over 1,000 firms, I find that founder CEOs perform best in IPO firms in a national 
context where managerial discretion is low, uncertainty avoidance is high, and fewer firms have 
founders as CEO. 
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ESSAY 1: MEDIA PERCEPTIONS OF FOUNDER CEOS VS. NON-FOUNDER CEOS 
IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurs have unique relationships with the firms they have created. Once an 
entrepreneur has successfully created a new venture, there are a multitude of benefits they can 
reap from remaining with their firm over time. One such benefit is performing well in the IPO 
process if it is undertaken (Nelson, 2003; Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Bains, 2007; He, 2008; Gao 
& Jain, 2011). Frequently, researchers that have studied the relationship between founder CEOs 
and IPO performance have investigated moderator variables between the presence of a founder 
CEO and IPO performance such as the amount of inside directors (Nelson, 2003), whether the 
company is in a high technology industry (Gao & Jain, 2011), the presence of entrepreneurial 
orientation (Mousa & Wales, 2012), and the size of CEO compensation packages (He, 2008). 
Thus, while we know that a relationship between founder CEOs and IPO performance exists, we 
do not clearly understand why it exists.  
In management literature and business news, it is consistently stressed that quality 
management is essential to a firm’s success. Given the amount of uncertainty and information 
asymmetry during the IPO process (Cohen & Dean, 2005), the importance of signifying 
appropriate leadership is amplified. However, despite research that shows that founders perform 
well even when they are running a large corporation (Fahlenbrach, 2009), there are mixed 
perceptions about founder CEOs’ abilities. For instance, when venture capitalists are involved in 
investing in an IPO firm, they take measures to “professionalize” the company including often 
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removing the founder and replacing them with a new CEO (Hellmann & Puri, 2002). However, 
removing founders prior to making an IPO is not always the best decision. Bains (2007) found 
that for a sample of biotechnology firms in the U.K., replacing members of the founding team 
prior to an IPO had an adverse effect on the company. Therefore, it is of interest to see how 
founders’ competence in running a public company is manifested through investigating their 
media presence and narratives. 
In order to understand how founder CEOs contribute to how their firms perform after 
making an IPO, it must be understood how founders and non-founders are portrayed to investors. 
For IPO firms, investors supplement information from prospectuses and minimal publicly 
available information on IPO firms with media information (Bhattacharya, Galpin, Ray, & Yu, 
2009; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008).  The media is also how 
the larger society understands what constitutes appropriate organizational actions (Hartz & 
Steger, 2010). Business media helps form narratives about firms that influence public opinion. 
Therefore, in this study, the narrative paradigm is used to investigate how founders and non-
founders in IPO firms are portrayed differently. The narrative paradigm considers the world as a 
series of stories that individuals deduct reality from (Stutts & Barker, 1999) and helps the general 
public form impressions of organizations (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).  
Narratives are how a population communicates events (Fenton & Langley, 2011) and 
processes social information (Dailey & Browning, 2014; Taylor & Van Every, 2000). 
Information about and provided by the CEO of a company particularly, is how a company’s 
strategy is communicated to others and is powerful in shaping perceptions of that same company 
(Amernic & Craig, 2007). Qualitatively investigating narratives about founder and non-founder 
CEOs can help understand the complexity behind investor and the public’s perception of newly 
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public firms. Using media information one year following an IPO for a group of matched pair 
firms and using a qualitative content analysis, I seek to reveal how founders and non-founders 
are represented differently.  
Specifically, I find three major themes in the media articles about founders and non-
founder CEOs in IPO firms that contribute to the literature on founder CEOs and the narrative 
paradigm. First, founder CEOs are more likely to have personal information and their 
background recorded by the media. This shows how entrepreneurs develop personal identities 
with their venture (Jones, Latham, & Betta, 2006) and how it can contribute to the strength of the 
narrative of a newly public company.  
Second, how founder CEOs narrate their business operations are different from non-
founders. Founder CEOs narrate how their business is improving and expanding in a way that 
puts their excellent social capital developed in their entrepreneurial process on display 
(Davidsson & Benson, 2003). Founders are more likely to describe certain processes in a 
technical way and then translate them for a broader audience to understand. Non-founder CEOs 
are more likely to only use technical language that could potentially isolate those that do not 
understand the particular industry.  Founders seem to use their cognitive social capital (Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998) they have developed throughout the entrepreneurial process to present a 
narrative that has the potential to be understood by a wider audience.  
Third, founder CEOs are more likely to be quoted talking about highly positive 
information such as making a contribution to society or their industry or winning an award. 
While both founders and non-founder CEOs win awards, founders express their gratitude for 
winning an award whereas non-founders are not quoted. Non-founder CEOs are more likely to 
be quoted talking about business operational issues.  
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In developing my arguments, I make three main contributions. First, I begin to address 
the direct relationship between founder CEO presence and IPO performance. I begin to answer 
the question ‘why do founder CEOs have an advantage in IPOs?’ I move beyond the widely-held 
academic assumption that founders behave differently.  In other words, this study begins to 
explore a potential causal underpinning of a widely established empirical fact.   
Second, I highlight how companies’, particularly IPO firms’, narratives unfold over time. 
Research about organizations, especially IPO firms, tends to focus on what happens during a 
snapshot of time. Martens, Jennings, and Jennings (2007) took into consideration how 
entrepreneurial narratives played a role in IPO firms acquiring resources. However, they looked 
at information in the prospectus and what happening at the time of the IPO.  I extend research 
such as Martens et al.’s (2007) to investigate narratives that develop in media and statements 
over time.  
Third, I add to the literature about how narratives help individuals external to the 
organization form impressions about the organizations. Studies that address how media 
constructs stories about organizations and management are underrepresented in the literature, 
especially considering the role mass media plays in the lives of individuals (Hartz & Steger, 
2010). There has also been minimal investigation into how entrepreneurial and managerial 
identity impacts how investors perceive an organization and its worthiness (Davis & Glynn, 
2011).  
 
2. THEORECTICAL CONTEXT: NARRATIVE PARADIGM 
 According to the narrative paradigm, the world consists of a series of stories 
which people use to deduce reality from (Stutts & Barker, 1999). Narratives are a form of 
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discourse and discourse is how individuals represent “particular aspects of social life” through 
language (Fairclough, 2013: 453). Stories are particularly important because this medium is the 
primary means by which a social group communicates events and (Fenton & Langley, 2011) 
processes social information (Dailey & Browning, 2014; Taylor & Van Every, 2000).  Stories 
are frequently used in communication since they are easy to understand as well as remember and 
they create a common ground between individuals (Barker & Gower, 2010). 
Narratives help an organization continue to exist. Internally, the iteration of narratives 
within the organization helps an organization’s citizens understand one another (Weick & 
Browning, 1986), legitimizes or illegitimatizes particular organizational practices (Siltaoja, 
2009) and helps formulate the organization’s strategy (Fenton & Langley, 2011). Narratives 
shape organizational culture by giving members a collective identity that is constructed by 
organizational actors through time (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). Externally, narratives help the 
general populace form impressions of the organization (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007), create 
a close relationship between an organization and its external stakeholders (Hatch & Schultz, 
2002), and form a collective identity of organizational members (Brown, 2006). Given that 
managing reputation through public relations has been shown to influence financial performance 
of organizations (Kiousis, Popescu, & Mitrook, 2007; Kim, 2001), managers certainly care about 
how their narratives are crafted and perceived by the public. 
Research has shown that the proportion of narrative material to generic financial 
information has increased over the years (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007; Arthur Andersen, 
2000). Corporations voluntarily report information that they believe will strengthen their 
narrative and investors’ and the external community’s impression of their purpose. For instance, 
reporting both financial expenditures and narrative information related to corporate social 
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responsibility has increased in popularity (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011). Growing access 
to information through multiple media formats has made forming narratives about an 
organization for the outside world to understand considerably more complicated and more 
important. This is particularly true for IPO firms. 
For IPO firms, there is not a lot of information available to individuals external to the 
organization relative to well-established and older public firms (Fernhaber & McDougall-Covin, 
2009). When a firm makes the transition from being private to becoming public they are making 
the decision to be more openly scrutinized by public opinion. Information beyond the financial 
information required to be reported in prospectuses, particularly through media channels, is what 
helps investors and external members of organizations form impressions about IPO firms 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Pollock et al., 2008).  Media is frequently 
how society understands what constitutes appropriate organizational actions (Hartz & Steger, 
2010). The general public and investors are considerably impressionable when it comes to IPO 
firms since they most likely have limited information about the inner workings of the firm. The 
narratives formed while a firm is making a public offering can set the tone for its public 
reputation down the line.  
Given the limited amount of information available about most IPO firms, investors often 
turn to the media for supplementary information. Media has been shown to impact IPO firms in a 
number of ways. A larger volume of news articles causes less underpricing in IPOs since 
investors have become more familiar with a firm when it has more exposure (Pollock & 
Rindova, 2003). Furthermore, the firms that analysts choose to provide more coverage to, and 
therefore produce more information about, tend to perform better in the IPO market (Das, Guo, 
& Zhang, 2006). In a study analyzing over 5,000 IPO companies and their institutional 
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ownership Field and Lowry (2009) found that institutions only own approximately 25% of IPO 
companies stock the first month of listing on average. Given a large percentage of retail 
investors, and that many firms price their IPO to attract retail investors (Fernando, Gatchev, & 
Spindt, 2005), narratives formed by the media are of particular interest since many retail 
investors get their information from business sources. 
 
3. RESEARCH CONTEXT: FOUNDER CEOs AND IPOs 
 A founder CEO is the individual that created a business and has remained in 
charge of that business since its inception (Nelson, 2003). A founder of a company considerably 
influences the identity of an organization. Certain characteristics of the founder, including 
educational background, often determine the path the firm takes and strongly influences its 
eventual longevity (Bates, 1990). If an entrepreneur remains with their firm as it continues to 
grow, their personality and identity continues to be intertwined with the venture. Entrepreneurs 
frequently show a considerable amount of passion towards their organization because they are 
“engaged in something that relates to a meaningful and salient self-identity for them” (Cardon, 
Wincent, Signh, & Drnovsek, 2009: 516).  
Frequently, companies decide to go public after periods of high growth (Pagano, Panetta, 
& Zingales, 1998) and need additional infusions of capital to continue to grow (Gompers, 1995).  
Once a company is growing at a certain pace, an entrepreneur may decide to exit or may be 
replaced by a venture capitalist. The conventional thinking that an entrepreneur would not be 
able to handle a large complex organization as well as a professional manager has been 
challenged over the years (Willard, Kreuger, & Feeser, 1992). 
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Nonetheless, organizational research consistently shows that when bankers are pricing 
initial public offerings for firms run by founder CEOs, they price the founder-run firms lower 
due to their frequent lack in expertise in running a public firm (Certo Certo, Covin, Daily, & 
Dalton, 2001). However, investors do not always share these impressions.   Specifically, 
investors value founder-run firms favorably, therefore causing an underpricing effect for the IPO 
offerings (Certo et al., 2001). It has been found in an array of studies since Certo et al’s (2001) 
findings that founder CEOs often outperform non-founder CEOs in IPOs with respect to short-
term stock market returns (Nelson, 2003; Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Bains, 2007; He, 2008; Gao 
& Jain, 2011).  
There has been some recent research seeking to understand how founders are different 
from non-founders with respect to subsequent financial performance of the IPO event. First, 
founder CEOs tend to have more inside directors at the time of IPO than non-founders (Nelson, 
2003). While the presence of more outside directors can enhance the amount of monitoring the 
board does of the management team (Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2011), it has been shown that 
having more inside directors is useful for young entrepreneurial firms that are making IPOs 
(Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). Inside directors are able to provide more firm-specific guidance 
that allows for the firm to make decisions best for that particular company. Second, founder 
CEOs lead to higher performance in technology-related industries and not in nontechnology 
industries (Gao & Jain, 2011). It is likely that technology companies that make IPOs are younger 
in age and have more idiosyncratic operations that would benefit from the leadership of someone 
that help create and promote the technology.  
Third, founders often encourage and support entrepreneurial risk-taking in their firms 
more so than non-founders (Mousa & Wales, 2012). Indeed, firm-wide entrepreneurial 
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orientation, which promotes innovation and outside-the-box thinking in an organization, has 
been shown to be positively related to firm performance (Davis, Bell, Payne, & Kreiser, 2010). 
Fourth, founders are often perceived to be valuable to investors because they are the best 
management for the money. Founder CEOs, on average, receive smaller compensation packages 
than non-founders (He, 2008). Even though founders may make less, they are still highly 
incentivized to help the firm perform well since so much of their own effort was expended in the 
creation process. 
While previous studies have provided useful insight into understanding entrepreneurs and 
what contributes to their value long into their company’s operations, the research has mostly just 
added moderating and mediating variables between founder CEOs and IPO performance to try to 
explain why this effect exists. We know that founder CEOs are often associated with higher 
levels of inside directors (Nelson, 2003), more developed entrepreneurial orientation (Mousa & 
Wales, 2012), greater salary discounts (He, 2008) that can lead to higher IPO performance. 
Quantitative analyses have shown us how certain groups lead to performance outcomes but do 
not describe the “how.” In other words, we do not fully understand the direct link between a 
founder CEO and IPO performance as the “how” this is achieved is largely speculative. To fully 
understand how founders and non-founders are perceived differently by investors, we need to 
understand their stories. This study attempts to do that through an inductive research design.  
 
4. METHODS 
4.1 Data Sources 
To unravel the narratives of founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs and unveil why they 
may be perceived differently by individuals external to the organization, a blended narrative and 
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ethnographic approach was taken. Narrative and ethnographic approaches are two of the five 
major data analysis traditions within qualitative research (Creswell, 2003). A narrative approach 
involves taking spoken or written words that give an account of an event or actions that are 
connected chronologically (Czarniawska, 2004). An ethnographic approach involves studying 
members of a group with shared values or behaviors and how these values are expressed through 
language. The types of stories that can be recorded in the narrative approach can be told to the 
researcher by the subjects, can be co-constructed between the researcher and the subjects, or be 
part of a performance (Creswell, 2012).  
A narrative approach to qualitative research typically brings to light how individuals 
identify and see themselves (Creswell, 2012). However, I am interested in how a medium (a third 
party) portrays the narratives of founder and non-founder CEOs. The media represents an 
important medium between businesses and the general population/investors. The business press 
are not considered a culture-sharing group in the traditional sense, but are actually part of 
forming shared opinions and influencing behaviors of those external to organizations. Blending a 
narrative approach and ethnography most accurately represents how a narrative about one party 
(CEOs of IPOs) are shaped by another party (the media) and are interpreted by a third party 
(investors). A blended approach offers a valuable and unique opportunity for understanding this 
complex relationship.   
4.1.1 Firm Selection A subsample of matched pairs was derived from all 309 U.S.-based 
IPOs that went public on the NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges between 2009 and 2011.  
Approximately 35% of all firms that made an IPO in this time frame had a founder CEO (107 
firms). When conducting a qualitative analysis, matched pairs is an optimal way to control for 
influencing factors outside the realm of the study. In line with previous literature, foreign 
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companies were removed from the sample (Chatalova, How, & Verhoeven, 2016) and matched 
pairs were based on comparable industry and size characteristics (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, 
& Wright, 2010; Fulmer, Gerhart, & Scott, 2003; Barber & Lyon, 1996; Loughran & Ritter, 
1997). Industry for each IPO was matched by 3-digit SIC code (Fulmer et al., 2003). IPO firms 
were also matched based on number of employees (Jorissen, Laveren, Martens, & Reheual, 
2005). A deviation of less than 20% was allowed in size to assure comparability. When 
measuring size based on of number of employees, the 20% deviation standard is commonly used 
(Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud, & Kurashina, 2008). Each matched pair had one firm that had a 
founder CEO and one firm that had a non-founder CEO. Overall, this matching procedure 
yielded a total of 20 matched pairs (40 firms) during the study period. This sample represents 
17% of all IPOs conducted for the selected time frame and a little over 20% of the IPO firms that 
have a founder CEO.  
4.1.2. Media Articles and Segmentation As previously mentioned, there is limited 
information about most IPO firms in their initial foray into the public markets and investors often 
turn to the media for supplementary information. The story media tells to their audience about 
IPO companies becomes embedded in the reputation and narrative of the organization. News 
articles about the firm were pulled from Factiva database. Factiva provides content from new 
media (i.e., newspapers, newswires, trade presses), social media (i.e., social networks, 
newsgroups, blogs) and multimedia (i.e., digital videos and TV transcripts) (Factiva, 2015). For 
the 40 IPO firms in the population, each firm was searched for in the Factiva database by 
entering the official company name in the “company” category and setting the date range to 
display articles for the day of the initial public offering to exactly one year after the company’s 
first day on the market. One year after the IPO was examined because the first year of being 
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public is an important time in the life of a company. It effectively sets the tone of the company’s 
narrative and influences. What happens in year one, influences whether a company survives to 
become a “seasoned” firm after five years (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  
The data from this search was selected in three steps. First, all news articles about the 
IPO firm published within one year from the IPO date were downloaded from the Factiva 
database. Second, using the “subject” function on Factiva, news articles that mentioned the CEO 
were extracted. Third, paragraphs from each article that mentioned, quoted, or referred to the 
CEO were separated and included as one unit of data. Once the data was segmented, one pair of 
firms had to be eliminated for insufficient data. The firms in the pair did not have at least five 
articles that mentioned the CEO and it would be difficult to construct a narrative with such 
minimal information.  
The final sample yielded 19 pairs (38 firms), 1,305 articles, and 1,057 code-able 
paragraphs. The sample of firms and initial data is included in Table 1. As can be seen in Table 
1, approximately 60% of the pairs had more articles about the founder CEO and 40% had more 
articles about the non-founder CEO. Table 1 contains the distribution of code-able paragraphs.  
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Table 1: Matched Pair Sample  
No Pair Company Date of 
IPO 
SIC Empl CEO Founder Percentage 
of Articles 
about CEO 
Paragraphs 
of Data 
1 1 Laredo Petroleum Inc 12/14/11 1311 266 Randy Foutch 1 13% 44 
2   Memorial Production 
Partners LP 
12/9/11 1311 309 John Weinzierl 0 20% 23 
3 2 Omeros Corp 10/8/09 2836 67 Gregory 
Demopulos 
1 4% 3 
4   Anacor 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
11/24/10 2834 65 David Perry 0 24% 36 
5 3 Zogenix Inc 11/23/10 2834 149 Roger Hawley 1 11% 30 
6   AVEO 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
3/12/10 2834 147 Tuan Ha-Ngoc 0 15% 40 
7 4 Anthera 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
3/1/10 2834 14 Paul Truex 1 12% 15 
8   Aegerion 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
10/22/10 2834 8 Marc Beer 0 10% 28 
9 5 NuPathe Inc 8/6/10 2834 26 Jane 
Hollingsworth 
1 4% 4 
10   AcelRx 
Pharmaceuticals Inc 
2/11/11 2834 25 Richard King 0 23% 20 
11 6 Solazyme Inc 5/27/11 2869 229 Jonathan 
Wolfson 
1 15% 55 
12   KiOR Inc 6/24/11 2869 212 Fred Cannon 0 8% 10 
13 7 Ubiquiti Networks 
Inc 
10/14/11 3663 183 Robert Pera 1 25% 107 
14   Boingo Wireless Inc 5/4/11 3669 160 David Hagan 0 2% 9 
15 8 MaxLinear Inc 3/24/10 3674 177 Kishore 
Seendripu 
1 5% 8 
16   Inphi Corp 11/12/10 3674 166 Young Sohn 0 4% 12 
17 9 InvenSense Inc 11/16/11 3674 16800 Steven Nasiri 1 10% 38 
18   Freescale 5/26/11 3674 16500 Richard Beyer 0 4% 28 
14 
 
Semiconductor Ltd 
19 10 Electromed Inc 8/13/10 3845 66 Robert Hansen 1 34% 19 
20   Zeltiq Aesthetics Inc 10/19/11 3841 52 Gordon Nye 0 4% 11 
21 11 SS&C Technologies 
Holdings Inc 
3/31/10 7372 1399 William Stone 1 29% 79 
22   Rosetta Stone Inc 4/16/09 7372 1218 Tom Adams 0 3% 5 
23 12 LogMeIn Inc 7/1/09 7372 209 Michael Simon 1 11% 23 
24   SolarWinds Inc 5/20/09 7372 268 Michael Bennett 0 4% 19 
25 13 Cornerstone 
OnDemand Inc 
3/17/11 7372 750 Adam Miller 1 18% 56 
26   Qlik Technologies 
Inc 
8/4/10 7372 780 Lars Bjork 0 4% 25 
27 14 Imperva Inc 11/9/11 7372 580 Shlomo Kramer 1 11% 22 
28   Jive Software Inc 12/13/11 7372 673 Anthony Zingale 0 10% 78 
29 15 Carbonite Inc 8/11/11 7379 421 David Friend 1 12% 38 
30   IntraLinks Holdings 
Inc 
8/6/10 7372 454 J Andrew 
Damico 
0 1% 5 
31 16 ServiceSource 
International In 
3/25/11 7373 2609 Michael Smerklo 1 7% 22 
32   Active Network 
Inc/The 
5/25/11 7372 3036 David Alberga 0 13% 25 
33 17 Voltari Corp 6/18/10 7389 339 Ryan Wuerch 1 10% 39 
34   OpenTable Inc 5/22/09 7389 300 Jeffrey Jordan 0 7% 10 
35 18 Envestnet Inc 7/29/10 7389 457 Judson Bergman 1 6% 8 
36   Higher One Holdings 
Inc 
6/17/10 7389 450 Dean Hatton 0 17% 18 
37 19 Zillow Inc 7/20/11 7389 688 Spencer Rascoff 1 6% 38 
38   QuinStreet Inc 2/11/10 7389 637 Douglas Valenti 0 6% 7 
             Totals:     1,057 
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4.2 Data Analysis 
4.2.1 Coding Strategy  Once the data was segmented, a coding frame was assembled. A 
coding frame was built from a pilot study of 5 pairs (10 firms) that were randomly selected. Pilot 
studies should include at least 10% of the data (Schreier, 2012). Using 22% of the firms in my 
data set allowed me to assure representativeness in information while building my coding frame. 
A coding frame is based off of what information is found within the data and theory (Joffe, 
2012). The coding frame was constructed based on a contrasting coding frame (Schreier, 2012). 
A contrasting coding frame involves identifying similarities with one source (founder CEOs), 
identifying similarities within a second source (non-founder CEOs), and then identifying 
differences between the two sources. Through an iterative process, the coding frame presented in 
Figure 1 was developed. The coding is appropriately exhaustive and saturated (Hopkins & King, 
2010). All categories are represented in the data multiple times and the residual category is only 
recorded sparingly (about 5% of the data). Any paragraph that does not fall under any of the 
categories developed in the coding frame is recorded as “residual.”  
 
16 
 
Figure 1: Coding Frame  
 Positive 
o Quote 
 Business expansion/ growth  
 Financial growth (PQBF) 
 Operation/ firm-specific growth (PQBO) 
 Mergers and acquisitions/ alliances/ JVs/ partnerships (PQBM) 
 Contribution to economy/ community/ industry (PQC) 
 Accomplishments/ awards (PQA) 
 Residual (PQR) 
o Nonquote 
 Accomplishments/ awards (PNA) 
 IPO success/ positive company performance (PNI) 
 Financing/ support (PNF) 
Negative 
o Quote 
 Operational issues/ problems (NQO) 
o Nonquote 
 Poor performance of stock/ company (NNP) 
 CEO exit (NNC) 
 Neutral 
o Quote 
 Quarterly/ overall assessment of strengths and weaknesses (NEQQ) 
 Company goals (NEQC) 
 Personnel changes/ human resources (NEQP) 
o Nonquote 
 Stock options/ compensation (NENS) 
 Conferences/ public relations (NENC) 
 CEO background, experience, business endeavors not related to the 
company (NENB) 
 Patents/ legal filings (NENP) 
 Residual (R) 
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To assess the reliability of the coding frame, approximately 18% of the data was coded 
by a second individual who is familiar with the literature. Pairs of firms were selected at random 
to be coded twice. Inter-rater reliability was calculated through a coefficient of agreement 
(Schreier, 2012) and was approximately 77%. Between 70% and 80% agreement is considered 
acceptable (George & Mallery, 2003). When coders disagreed on the classification of a 
paragraph, it was reviewed again and a consensus met.       
    
5. FINDINGS 
 After comparing founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs in IPOs portrayal in the 
media, three major narrative themes were revealed by the data. Summaries of each theme and 
representative quotes from the data are included in Table 2.  
5.1 Theme 1: Strength of Founder CEOs’ Personal Narratives 
  By far, the biggest difference between the information presented about non-founder 
CEOs and founder CEOs of IPO companies in the media was the amount of personal information 
about the CEO. Overwhelmingly, founder CEOs had their personal narrative included in the 
media more frequently than non-founders. This information was coded under the category 
“Neutral, Nonquote, and CEO Background.”  
For founder CEOs, 12 of the 19 firms (55%) included some detailed information about 
who the founder was. For non-founders, CEO personal and background information was only 
included for 4 firms (18%). A little over 14% of all the data coded for founder CEOs was about 
their background or experience while only 2% of the non-founder information was coded as 
such.  
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Beyond the frequency counts, the content about founders was typically much different 
from non-founders. The background about founder CEOs was typically more personal than that 
about non-founders. As can be seen in Table 2 in a quote about wireless technology company 
Ubiquiti Networks’ founder Robert Pera, the quote explains how Pera “lives lean” and how he 
approaches his personal life as well as his business is “sparse,” “stripped-down,” and “efficient.” 
The media paints a picture of an entrepreneur who directly identifies with their company. The 
quote about Robert Pera exemplifies how individuals “orient themselves around particular 
organizational issues” and entrepreneurs form identities through the venture creation process 
(Jones et al., 2006: 332). There are other instances throughout the data that exemplifies how 
entrepreneurs identify with their companies. For instance, an article about motion tracking sensor 
firm InvenSense mentions how their founder CEO has been working in their particular 
technology niche of the company for “35 years and accumulated the kind of people who are as 
passionate about the technology as he is.” Steven Nasiri’s identity is tied into the development of 
motion-sensor technology and actually has a technology platform named after him (Bloomberg, 
2015).  
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Table 2: Themes within the Findings 
Theme Description Representative Data* 
1. Strength of 
founder CEOs’ 
personal 
narratives 
The background 
about CEOs 
personal and 
business experience 
was much more 
prevalent and in-
depth for founder 
CEOs than non-
founder CEOs of 
IPO companies.   
Company/ 
Founder 
Quote 
Laredo 
Petroleum 
(founder) 
“Foutch started three companies prior to Laredo, choosing to keep all 
privately held and later sell them. Last year he took Laredo public, saying 
it was built ‘for the long haul.’” 
Ubiquiti 
Networks 
(founder) 
“Robert J. Pera lives lean. The Apple engineer turned entrepreneur never 
checks a bag at the airport, leases a BMW and keeps a sparsely furnished 
one-bedroom apartment in San Jose, Calif. Pera takes a similar stripped-
down approach toward running Ubiquiti Networks, the maker of wireless-
networking gear he founded in 2005 and that went public in October. ‘My 
aim is to build something great as efficiently as possible,’ he says.” 
Electromed Inc 
(founder) 
CEO Bob Hansen and his brother Craig founded Electromed in 1992. 
Hansen said they aimed to help people with excess secretions in their 
lungs to breathe easier. The two brothers initially worked out of the 
University of Wisconsin-Stout's incubator, where they conducted early 
experimentation and prototyping. 
Jive Software 
(non-founder) 
“Zingale became Jive's chairman and CEO in February 2010 and helped 
guide it to its public offering. He and the founders celebrated at their 
January board meeting by opening a 60-year-old bottle of scotch. Zingale 
previously served as CEO of Mercury Interactive, until its acquisition by 
HP, and as president and CEO of the sales outsourcing and strategy firm 
Clarify.” 
Aegerion 
Pharmaceuticals 
(non-founder) 
“Before creating Viacell, Marc Beer held several senior positions both in 
global marketing and business development, including being responsible 
for the global launch of several products for orphan diseases as Vice 
President of Global Marketing within Genzyme's therapeutics division. He 
has also held the position of VP, Sales & Marketing at Biostar, Inc. as well 
as senior management positions in the Pharmaceutical and Diagnostic 
divisions of Abbott Laboratories. He serves on the Biotechnology Industry 
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Organization (BIO) Emerging Companies Section Governing Body, he is 
Chairman of Good Start Genetics, and a member of the board of Seaside 
Therapeutics.” 
2. How 
founder CEOs 
narrate 
business 
operations 
Founders are more 
likely describe 
certain processes in 
a technical way and 
then translate them 
for a broader 
audience to 
understand. Non-
founder CEOs are 
more likely to only 
use technical 
language that could 
potentially isolate 
those that do not 
understand the 
particular industry. 
Zogenix Inc 
(founder) 
“Roger Hawley, chief executive officer of Zogenix, stated, ‘…SUMAVEL 
DosePro is being used as a treatment alternative for patients who require 
fast onset of pain relief during migraine attacks as well as by those who do 
not adequately respond to oral triptans for more challenging migraine 
attacks that are very painful, disabling and disruptive to their lives and 
careers.’” 
SS&C 
Technologies 
Holdings Inc 
(founder) 
“‘Since its release, the new integrated Syndicated Bank Loans processing 
software and related software-enabled services has generated interest and 
provides the support needed to manage this complex asset class 
without having to rely on spreadsheets or specialty systems which make it 
more difficult to control your investment and reporting processes,’ said 
Bill Stone, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, SS&C Technologies 
Holdings, Inc. “ 
Anacor 
Pharmaceuticals 
(non-founder) 
"‘In the short time since our IPO, we have executed on our goals of 
initiating our two Phase 3 trials for AN2690 in onychomycosis and 
initiating the final Phase 2b trial for AN2728 in psoriasis. In addition we 
signed a collaboration 
agreement with Medicis to leverage our boron chemistry platform toward 
the discovery of a new acne therapy,’ said David Perry, Chief Executive 
Officer of Anacor Pharmaceuticals.” 
SolarWinds Inc 
(non-founder) 
“Mike Bennett: SolarWinds CEO calls Tek-Tools 'a great fit,' says its 
lineup complements his company's. Austin-based SolarWinds Inc. on 
Wednesday expanded its network management software line by acquiring 
Tek-Tools Inc. of Dallas for $42 million in cash and stock.” 
3. Positive and 
negative name 
association 
Founder CEOs are 
more likely to be 
quoted talking about 
highly positive 
information such as 
making a 
MaxLinear Inc 
(founder) 
“MaxLinear Inc., (NYSE: MXL) a leading provider of integrated radio 
frequency (RF) and mixed-signal integrated circuits for broadband 
communication applications, announced that Dr. Kishore Seendripu, Chief 
Executive Officer, received the Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The 
Year(R) 2010 Award in the technology category in San Diego. According 
to Ernst & Young LLP, the award recognizes outstanding entrepreneurs 
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contribution to 
society or their 
industry or winning 
an award. Non-
founder CEOs are 
more likely to be 
quoted talking about 
business operational 
issues. 
who are building and leading dynamic, growing businesses. Seendripu 
was selected by an independent panel of judges, and the award was 
presented at a gala event at the Hyatt Regency La Jolla on June 9.” 
Carbonite Inc 
(founder) 
"‘The companies that Smaller Business Association of Newe England 
(SBANE)… will be honoring have all made a positive impact on the lives 
of their customers, their employees and the economy of our region,’ said 
Friend. ‘I am excited to be a part of this event and to have the opportunity, 
along with SBANE, to honor pioneering ideas and the businesses pursuing 
them.’" 
Freescale 
Semiconductor 
Ltd (non-
founder) 
“Asked why his company's IPO was so lackluster after last week's 
blockbuster stock-market debut of social-networking company LinkedIn 
Corp.—whose shares rose as much as 173% from their IPO price—
Mr. Beyer said it wasn't fair to compare the two deals. 'I think the social-
networking companies are operating in a different realm right now,’ he 
said. ‘They are just not tied to the same macroeconomic conditions.’” 
AcelRx 
Pharmaceuticals 
Inc (non-
founder) 
“AcelRx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Nasdaq: ACRX), a specialty 
pharmaceutical company focused on the development and 
commercialization of innovative therapies for the treatment of acute and 
breakthrough pain, today announced that Richard King, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, will present at the Rodman & Renshaw Global 
Investment Conference in New York, NY at The Waldorf Astoria. The 
presentation is scheduled for Tuesday, September 13, 2011 at 1:35 p.m. 
ET.” 
*Founder CEO firms are in the gray columns and non-founder CEO firms are in the white columns 
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 There was also a considerable amount of background information about founder CEOs 
that was related to their personal motivation. For instance, the Electromed founders, Bob and 
Craig Hansen, references how they were motivated to help particular patients and how they were 
able to tests their ideas in a business incubator. Furthermore, a quote about Cornerstone 
OnDemand, a cloud-based human resources company, mentions how their founder CEO, Adam 
Miller, also runs their foundation to “help empower communities” and focuses on “education, 
workforce development and disaster relief.”  
According to O’Connor (2002), the three basic categories of entrepreneurial narratives 
are personal, generic, and situational series. Personal stories entail an important moment in the 
entrepreneur’s life, a particular breakthrough innovation, or their personality. A generic story 
may pertain to how the company competes or is strategically oriented. And a situational story is 
about factors outside the entrepreneur’s control and how the company is just a small piece of a 
larger puzzle. The data here shows that founder CEOs that eventually take their firms through an 
IPO are more likely to adapt a personal narrative. The information coded frequently shows how 
lifestyle (such as Pera) passion (such as Nasiri or Miller) and technological breakthroughs (such 
as the Hansens) are the driving factors of their success.  
 In contrast, the background information that is included about non-founder CEOs 
of IPO companies is not as personal in nature. The quote in Table 2 about Jive Software CEO 
celebrating with a nice bottle of scotch of their IPO paints a picture of extravagance and not 
personal motivation. The quote about Zingale of Jive is very different regarding (firstname) Pera 
of Ubiquiti. Pera left a major company (Apple) and lives efficiently while Zingale sold a 
company to another major company (HP) and drinks scotch at board meetings. Zingale’s story is 
about celebrating the business accomplishment of making an IPO and Pera’s story is about his 
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business being an extension of his personality. The two companies and CEOs may or may not 
actually be that much different in their behavior. However, the media paints very contrasting 
views. Moreover, the paragraph about Agerion Pharmaceuticals CEO (see Table 2) lists his 
previous experience that is rather impressive. However, his personal motivation for his job 
choice is not included and the readers do not get a sense of his personality. This is much different 
from the quote about the Hansen brothers interested in helping individuals breathe easier through 
biomedical technology. All the examples mentioned in this section show how founders’ 
narratives are prevalent in the information presented to the investment community. Given the 
findings of Theme 1, the following proposition is advanced: 
Proposition 1: Founder CEOs elicit more personal stories in the media than non-founder 
CEOs during the first year after an initial public offering.   
5.2 Theme 2: Founder CEOs Narrating Business Operation 
The most frequently coded category of the whole coding frame was “Positive, Quote, 
Business Expansion/Growth, Operation/Firm-specific Growth.” CEOs of IPO companies are 
most often described in the media if they are talking about how their firm is advancing in some 
way. Since the media helps investors form impressions about IPO firms (Bhattacharya et al., 
2009; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Pollock et al., 2008), it makes sense that CEOs would try to use 
that opportunity to their advantage by talking about what their company does to the media.  
Furthermore, it is also notable that most information that CEOs are quoted saying is 
overwhelmingly positive about their company. This could be explained by the “Pollyanna 
principle” where positive language is used more frequently than negative language (Rutherford, 
2005). The Pollyanna principle is frequently used in annual reports, letters to shareholders, and 
financial reviews (Rutherford, 2005; Hildebrandt & Snyder, 1981). Basically, anything the CEO 
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touches is going to appear to be overly positive. Primarily positive information could also be 
explained by CEO’s impressions of their company at time of IPO. A CEO may not take their 
company, or investors will not have a CEO in place during IPO, that does not feel like the 
company is going in a positive direction.  
Looking at the frequency counts, founder CEOs are more frequently in the media talking 
about their company’s progress than non-founders. Overall, there are 219 quotes from founders 
compared to 149 from non-founders. Within the category of business expansion and growth there 
were three subcategories, financial growth, operations or firm-specific growth, and external 
diversification (i.e., mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures). A larger percentage of the total 
information about non-founders are these quotes about business operations. External 
diversification is mentioned frequently because a common reason for a company to make an IPO 
is to gain capital to make acquisitions and externally diversify. A little over 30% of companies 
start engaging in mergers and acquisitions within the first year of being public (Celikyurt, 
Sevilir, & Shivdasani, 2009). In this study, 10 of the 22 (45%) non-founder-run companies 
mention external diversification in some way. This is significantly more than the 5 of 19 (26%) 
of founder ran companies. This means that not only are founders more likely to talk about their 
own business operations, but they are more likely to focus on their current business and not rapid 
expansion.  
One of the most telling difference between founders and non-founders of IPO firms when 
being quoted about their business operations is how they narrate what is happening in their firm. 
If you compare the quote of founder CEO Roger Hawley of Zogenix Inc and non-founder CEO 
David Perry of Anacor Pharmaceuticals in Table 2 you can see this difference. Both companies 
are in the pharmaceuticals industry and are talking about different drugs they are developing. 
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Hawley translates how the drug works in laymen’s terms. He says that it is helpful for those who 
experience migraines that are “painful, disabling and disruptive to their lives and careers.” This 
is powerful imagery that most people can relate to or imagine. In Perry’s case he is descriptive in 
a more technical way. He talks about leveraging their “boron chemistry platform” and “initiating 
the final Phase 2b trial.” Using more technical language can make the firm seem more 
impersonal. Examining the quotes from CEOs about business operations from a matched pair in 
the dataset further exemplifies the difference in narration.  
The founder CEO of LogMeIn Inc, a technology company providing cloud-based 
services, is quoted saying their services allow customers “access to their applications and files 
anytime, from wherever they are” and that his company has a human resource strategy oriented 
towards providing “an environment that is both fun and professionally fulfilling.” In comparison, 
non-founder CEO of SolarWinds Inc, a company that develops software for IT professionals, is 
quoted saying that his employees “remain focused on consistently executing upon every element 
of the business” and that they are happy with the “strength of [their] business model.” The 
difference in language used can resonate differently with their customers.  
The type of language used by the CEOs depends on their level of social skills. Founder 
CEOs are successful entrepreneurs and successful entrepreneurs typically have well-developed 
social skills that allow them to interactive effectively with others and adapt appropriately to 
different social contexts (Baron & Markman, 2000). When considering a narrative, it is 
important that a common ground exists between the party communicating the narrative and the 
party reading or listening to the narrative (Fuller & Tian, 2006). This ensures that the receiving 
parties continue to have interest in the narrative. Therefore, when non-founders appear to use 
26 
 
more technical language that is rather specific to their business, they are minimizing the 
individuals with which they share common ground.  
Founders, who use some technical language and explain operations in a way that a 
broader audience can understand, may spark the interest of more investors. Indeed, founder 
CEOs may be more effective at expressing ideas and feelings openly and clearly (Baron & Tang, 
2008). It is quite possible that by the time an entrepreneur has successfully completed an IPO, 
their social skills have become even stronger. The ability to effectively justify business 
operations to a wide range of people during the entrepreneurial process may prove to give 
founder CEOs an edge in appearing personable in the media.  
To make sure that how founder CEOs talk about their company is indeed a function of 
their social capabilities and not of the source in which the story was reported, an ad-hoc test was 
performed. A portion of the quotes about firm-specific information from the CEO were 
reexamined taking into account whether the quote was technical or not technical and which news 
source the quote was reported in to eliminate any source bias. The ad-hoc test revealed that the 
news sources for each pair of companies were typically the same or similar. Both companies 
with founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs were in a mix of sources including standard business 
media (i.e., Globenewswire and Businesswire) and local news sources (i.e., Tulsa World and 
Austin American-Statesmen), and there was no difference between CEOs using technical or 
nontechnical language based off of the source. Given the new insight gained from Theme 2, I 
propose that: 
Proposition 2: Founder CEOs in first-year IPO firms possess unique social skills that 
help portray their business operations more clearly and in simpler language than non-
founder CEOs.  
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5.3 Theme 3: Positive and Negative Name Association 
 In instances where CEOs were asked to comment on or were quoted talking about a 
particular award/accomplishment or a contribution to society or their industry it was always a 
founder CEO who was being quoted. There were 4 founder CEOs who specifically mentioned 
how they felt it was important that they were contributing to society in some way. One example 
is included in Table 2. Carbonite Inc founder CEO stresses the importance of being part of an 
event that honors companies that have “a positive impact on the lives of their customers, their 
employees and the economy of our region.” There are no such quotes that take about impact 
from non-founder CEOs. Founder CEOs are also much more likely to talk about awards they 
have received. Six founder CEOs were quoted talking about specific awards or personal 
accomplishments, such as the Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year award won by Kishore 
Deendripu of MaxLinear Inc reflected in Table 2. There are a few instances (for two companies) 
that non-founders are mentioned for winning an award of a major accomplishments. However, 
the CEO does not actually comment on the award. For example, non-founder Lars Bjork of 
QlickTech won an Ernst & Young award as well.  However, the paragraphs containing the 
information just had one sentence acknowledging the fact with no quote from Bjork.   
Conversely, non-founder CEOs are more frequently in the media talking about issues 
with business. There was not a lot media within the dataset that had a negative sentiment. There 
were a few instances where both founders and non-founders were mentioned along with 
struggling IPO performance and 3 CEOs (1 founder and 2 non-founders) actually exited their 
company within the first year. However, when it came to CEOs being quoted about something 
that had a negative impact on their business, it was more frequent that non-founders were quoted. 
An example of quote reflecting negative sentiment is recorded in Table 2 for Freescale 
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Semiconductor Ltd. The CEO had to explain why the company’s IPO was not performing well in 
comparison to others. Taken together that more founder CEOs talk about awards, 
accomplishments and contributions and more non-founder CEOs talk about performance or 
business issues, it is possible that investors and the general public can form opinions of CEOs 
and their abilities by these associations.  
It is also notable that founders and non-founders make public appearances equally as 
often. When tabulating the number of times it was announced that a CEO would be appearing or 
speaking at a conference, it was about equal for founders and non-founders. There were 16 firms 
and 63 total announcements for non-founders CEOs and 17 firms and 64 announcements for 
founders. An example of such an announcement is included in Table 2 for AcelRx 
Pharmaceuticals. Therefore, the associations with positive and negative associations have added 
importance. Given the findings from Theme 3, the following propositions are made: 
Proposition 3a: Founder CEOs appear to spend more time highlighting positive 
accomplishments of both themselves and their company during the first year of IPO than 
non-founder CEOs.  
Proposition 3b: Non-founder CEOs appear to face more media scrutiny than founder 
CEOs one year following an IPO.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
My objective in this study was to understand how founder and non-founder CEOs’ 
narratives are portrayed differently in business media. I studied media articles about CEOs of 
companies one year after their IPO and how their narratives were formed differently. 
Specifically, I found that founder CEOs have more personal information/background that 
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showcases their entrepreneurial identity, founder CEOs narrate their business operations in a way 
that a broader audience can understand rather than using mostly technical language like non-
founders, and that founders are more likely to be quoted talking about societal contributions and 
winning awards while non-founder CEOs are more likely to be quoted talking about business 
operational issues. I believe my findings can contribute to research on the narrative paradigm in 
organizations as well as research on founder CEOs.  
6.1 Contributions 
This study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it extends the literature 
on organizational narratives by examining how narratives are constructed about CEOs in the 
media. Frequently, in organizational studies and in qualitative research, researchers consider how 
narratives are representative of the person or the group of individuals that are telling the 
narrative. The narratives shaped and told by an intermediary and how the constructed narratives 
impact the identity of an organization is not studied as frequently. Narratives have been shown to 
help the general populace form impressions of an organization (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). 
Furthermore, how managerial decisions are presented does influence media coverage and media 
coverage sentiment can influence CEO job security and elements of CEO compensation (Bednar, 
2012).  
Therefore, it is important to analyze the narratives of CEOs in IPO companies since it 
sets the tone for the perception formed by the general public over time. A CEO’s narrative can 
play a significant role in influencing their organization’s narrative in the eyes of outsiders. CEOs 
are able to not only use their interpersonal skills to win over members internal to the organization 
but try to influence external members including the media (Bednar, 2012). Founder CEO’s 
influence was shown by the large amount of quoted information from CEOs about their 
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companies, how founder CEOs did a good job translating their operations into layperson terms, 
and their discussion of awards that they have won being meaningful.  
Second, this study shows how third party narratives develop over time and contribute to 
the organizational identity of an IPO company by bridging the founder CEO and IPO literature 
with the entrepreneurial identity and organizational identity literature. How an entrepreneur or a 
CEO identifies with their company influences the organization’s identity. Navis and Glynn 
(2011) propose that an entrepreneur’s ability to develop a “legitimately distinctive 
entrepreneurial identity” is how they win over investors. An identity that is both legitimate and 
distinct has similarities between established businesses (legitimacy) but also some noticeable 
differences (distinctiveness) (Navis & Glynn, 2011). The fact that founder CEOs are more 
prevalent in the media, have more background information about them that shows their 
entrepreneurial identity, and that founders are more likely to translate their firm’s operations for 
a broader audience shows both their entrepreneurial identity helps create their organizational 
identity. Constructing a positive organizational narrative in the media is particularly useful for 
IPO firms since media impacts investor perception of the IPO (Pollock & Rindova, 2003) and 
lays the groundwork for the company’s corporate reputation.  
Third, this study shows the importance of a salient relationship between the CEO and 
their company. Internally, a CEO needs to show commitment and credibility to keep their 
employees on board with the company’s mission and engaged in their work (Men, 2012). 
However, a CEO’s commitment and relationship with their company needs to be show to 
members outside an organization in a socially salient way. In a study about the perceptions of 
ethical leadership, Treviño, Brown, and Hartman (2003) show that CEOs must engage in 
behaviors that are noticeable to individuals outside of the top management team in order to be 
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perceived as an ethical leader.  Similarly, a CEO needs to show socially salient behavior that 
identifies them with their company in an IPO setting. Founder CEOs in IPO firms were required 
to develop and hone particular human capital and social skills to be able to successfully create 
their venture and maintain the head of the company through the IPO process. These attributes are 
both noted in the media through including personal information about many of the founder CEOs 
and showcased in the media through founders’ discussion of their company’s operations and 
what contributions they make to their community and society. It is possible that this is seen as 
socially salient behavior to investors.  
6.2 Limitations & Directions of Future Research 
In addition to the findings about CEO narratives, there was some information found in 
this study that extends prior research in the area. First, interestingly, there were more reports of 
stockholdings of CEOs changing for founder CEOs than non-founder CEOs within the first year 
of making an IPO. 69 different reports of stockholdings changing for 17 founder-ran firms were 
reported while only 40 reports of stockholdings changing for 15 non-founder-ran firms were 
reported. This could potentially indicate the importance of CEO ownership in IPO valuations 
discussed by Certo, Daily, Cannella, and Dalton (2003). While Certo et al. (2003), focus on 
investor evaluation at the time of IPO based on the stock option packages indicated in 
prospectuses, this study shows that it could be potentially fruitful for researchers to look at what 
happens as stock options change after the issuing of an IPO. Founders are typically known for 
being paid less than a hired manager (He, 2008), therefore, it is interesting that their stock 
options change more frequently. Further research about the exact nature of these changes and 
how it impacts performance could be undertaken in the future.  
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Second, the nature of doing more in-depth qualitative research involves smaller sample 
sizes. Sometimes this can limit the generalizability of a study; however, the firms included in the 
38 firm sample of this study include firms from the most popular industries that make IPOs. 
Between 2009 and 2012 the most common industry to have IPOs was the technology sector 
(Renaissance Capital, 2015). The technology sector is represented by pairs 13 through 25 seen in 
Table 1. In 2013 and 2014, the most common industry sector of IPOs was healthcare 
(Renaissance Capital, 2015), which is represented in pairs 3 through 7. Therefore, the results 
here have some power to be generalized. However, it would be interesting in the future to 
compare different industries and how that determines the prevalence and content of CEO 
narratives. It is possible that companies in industries that more visible to mass public have CEOs 
that get more exposure. Technology firms that make products for the general public versus firms 
that do business to business sales could be represented differently, for example. It would also be 
interesting to interview and survey investors about their impressions of content about IPO firms 
in the future. 
Third, looking at information about an IPO firm one year after it is made is important 
step in understanding how their narrative starts form as a newly publicly traded company. 
However, it would be of interest to investigate what happens after this stage. An area of research 
for future studies would be to extend a small sample of companies’ narratives into the future. 
IPO firms that experience different types of outcomes, such as delisting, acquisition, and so 
forth, could be investigated to see if there are some similarities.  
6.3 Conclusion 
In this study I addressed how narratives about founder and non-founder CEOs influence 
the perception of IPO firms to those external to the company. I found that founder CEOs have 
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more personal information/background that showcases their entrepreneurial identity, founder 
CEOs narrate their business operations in a way that a broader audience can understand rather 
than using mostly technical language like non-founders, and that founders are more likely to be 
quoted talking about societal contributions and winning awards while non-founder CEOs are 
more likely to be quoted talking about business operational issues. This research contributes to 
the literature about founder CEOs, IPOs, and organizational narratives in a meaningful way.  
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ESSAY 2:  THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CONTEXT IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FOUNDER CEOS AND IPO PERFORMANCE 
 
7. INTRODUCTION 
 We know from previous research that founder CEOs of IPO companies generally perform 
better than non-founder CEOs in the United States (Nelson, 2003; Fischer & Pollock, 2004; He, 
2008; Gao & Jain, 2011). Previous explanations for this difference are: (1) Founders invest more 
in research and development than non-founders (Fahlenbrach, 2009), (2) they have more 
ownership and control over certain governance mechanisms at IPO (Nelson, 2003), (3) they 
possess unique human capital relevant to the company’s operations (Fischer & Pollock, 2004), 
and (4) they are psychologically connected to their firms as stewards (Walters, Le, & Kroll, 
2015). Founders outperforming non-founders challenges the notion that founder CEOs do not 
have what it takes to run a more complex and publicly traded company within the United States 
(Bloom & Van Reenen, 2010).  
However, the impact of founder CEOs on IPO performance outside the United States has 
yet to be explored. Conclusions drawn from the United States market may not be valuable 
outside the United States because the United States has a unique business environment (Busenitz, 
Gómez, & Spencer, 2000) that gives managers a lot of power to make decisions (Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2011) and makes the IPO market robust and diverse (Ernst & Young, 2011). Upper 
echelon theory’s basic premise, officially introduced by Hambrick and Mason in 1984, is that 
managers’ experiences, interpretations of situation and personalities influence how they make 
decisions. The CEOs of companies in different national settings and their participation in 
different social practices leads to different perceptions (Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005). Given 
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contextual differences, specific characteristics of managers may not equate the same outcomes in 
different national settings. For example, Engelen, Schmidt, Strenger, & Brettel (2014) found that 
certain leadership behaviors and whether they lead to innovation in organizations was moderated 
by national culture. In another example, Brodbeck et al. (2000) found that leaders being 
participative was much more important in Northern and Western Europe than in Southern and 
Eastern Europe and administrative capabilities were viewed as essential to be a good leader in 
Russia and Georgia while not in other countries in Europe. Therefore, culture can influence the 
perception of leaders and management. Therefore, this study answers calls in the literature to 
investigate upper echelon theory outside the United States (Hambrick, 2007; Finkelstein, 
Hambrick, Cannella, 2009) since the influence of upper echelons varies with macrosocial context 
(Hambrick, 2007). It is possible that the culture surrounding a stock market exchange can 
influence the perception of what experiences and attributes in a manager are best for leading a 
newly public company. 
Furthermore, national level variables do influence IPO performance. Notably, the culture 
of the market influences investors’ behavior in IPO firms (Costa, Crawford, Jakob, 2013). In 
fact, Engelen and van Essen (2010) found that across different nations, 10% of the level of 
underpricing in IPOs was explained by national context and Costa et al. (2013) found that 
multiple cultural factors within nations explained around 40% variance in underpricing between 
different countries.  
Founder CEOs, who have been in charge of their organizations since inception, have 
unique characteristics that a lot of non-founder CEOs do not have. Founders tend to be more 
future-oriented than individuals without entrepreneurial experience (Das & Teng, 1997) and have 
the ability to handle uncertainty well (Shane, Venkataraman, & MacMillan, 1995; de Luque & 
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Javidan, 2004). Founder CEOs are successful entrepreneurs who were able to stay with their 
companies even after they went public. Founders do maintain many behaviors of entrepreneurs 
even when managing a larger and publicly-traded firm (Fahlenbrach, 2009). Given that 
entrepreneurs do align with particular values, such as being oriented towards the future, it is 
possible that sociocultural factors influence how investors make decisions about entrepreneurs 
and the companies they run.  
 This paper attempts to answer the question “how does national context influence the 
relationship between founder CEO presence and IPO long-run performance across multiple 
nations?” I want to investigate how certain societal factors influence IPO investment decisions in 
IPO firms that are founder run. With the globalization of stock markets and increased IPO 
activity across the world, it is important for management to understand what makes their offering 
valuable in the eyes of investors. This study contributes to a growing area of cross-national IPO 
research in management. IPO activity is inherently different across markets given institutional 
factors (Lewellyn & Bao, 2014) and the role and perception of management is often different 
dependent upon culture norms (Matsuda, Vanderwerf, & Scarbrough, 1994). Therefore, 
investigating the relationship between culture, management, and IPO performance will allow for 
a more robust understanding of how upper echelon influence varies across contexts.  
 This paper uses hierarchical linear modeling and a sample of over 1,000 firms across 
eight nations and nine exchanges to investigate how certain institutional factors influence how 
founder CEOs perform in IPOs compared to hired managers. Namely, the role of managerial 
discretion, uncertainty avoidance, future orientation, and standard practices are investigated. The 
analysis shows that international exchanges do not behave the same as the United States. 
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Notably, managerial discretion, uncertainty avoidance, and standard practices at the national 
level show the most influence on how a founder CEO performs in an IPO firm.  
 
8. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 Previous research on the link between founder CEOs and IPO performance has 
comprised a range of theoretical explanations including information theories such as signaling 
theory (Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Jain & Tabak, 2008), resource-based theories such 
as resource dependency theory (Nelson, 2003) and resource-exhaustion-based perspective 
(Mousa & Wales, 2012), social theories such as social capital theory (Fischer & Pollock, 2003) 
and network theory (Yang, Zimmerman, & Jiang, 2011) and mix of other theories such as 
agency/stewardship theory (He, 2008), and institutional economic theory (Ding, Nowak, & 
Zhang, 2010). Each study has contributed to the understanding of the relationship between 
founder CEOs and IPO performance within the particular context being studied. In order to 
understand the relationship between founder CEOs and IPOs across multiple nations, a broader 
theoretical context is needed.  
Upper echelon theory is founded on the logic that managers’ experiences, interpretations 
of situations, and personalities influence how they make organizational and strategic decisions 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). A manager’s personality and experiences influences their decision 
making patterns because people are boundedly rational (Simon, 1979) and are unable to know 
every possible alternative when making a complex strategic decision (Cyert & March, 1963). In 
complicated situations, it is not easy to recognize the best choice and there may not be one best 
choice. Therefore, managers “inject a great deal of themselves” including their personality into 
how they make decisions (Finklestein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009: 44).  
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Management, particularly CEOs, have considerably more influence over their firm the 
smaller the organization (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). Therefore, management’s 
influence declines as firms grow in size. The event of an IPO offers an interesting context to 
study the role of upper echelon influence on their firm since it is a large milestone in the 
development of an organization. CEOs are inevitably under public scrutiny. Investors make 
judgments of venture quality based off of management characteristics (Higgins & Gulati, 2003) 
and important managerial decisions at the time of IPO determine how well the firm will perform 
or even survive as a publicly traded company in future (Jain & Kini, 2008). Upper echelon 
theory can help distinguish the differences in performance for founder CEOs and non-founder 
CEOs in IPO companies because the amount of influence a CEO has on their company at IPO 
varies based on their status as a founder or not as founder. Founders and their personality and 
experiences exert more influence over the organization in two important ways. 
First, entrepreneurs and their identities are imprinted on their organization. During the 
startup phase, strategic imperatives and most likely the same as the founder’s personal 
motivation for starting a company (Souder, Simsek, & Johnson, 2012). The founder sets the tone 
for the strategic direction of their company. Founder-managed companies typically closely 
reflect the personality of the founder and their background (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 
2004). Therefore, as a firm grows and progresses, founders know how to influence members 
within their organization that is consistent with the company’s values because it is often closely 
tied to their own values.  
Second, founders typically hold a large portion of the ownership in their companies 
(Miller, Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011) even after making an IPO (Nelson, 2003). Founders have 
been shown to own over 30% of the shares outstanding in their companies after IPO (Bruton, 
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Chahine, & Filatotchev, 2009) as opposed to the average of 14% ownership of a sample of all 
CEOs in IPO companies (Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 2003). Ownership in a company, 
whether it is possessed by management team members, board directors, or those outside the firm, 
is associated with more identification with the company and its objectives (Filatotchev & Bishop, 
2002). Given that a founder has larger financial ties to their organization on average, a founder’s 
imprint can continually influence the company’s strategic direction.  
Given that managers influence their firm’s performance based on their characteristics and 
experiences and experiences and characteristics vary internationally, how different managers 
perform in IPO firms across nations will be explored in this study. The next section will develop 
the hypotheses about which contextual factors moderate the relationship between founder 
presence in IPO firms and stock market performance.  
 
9. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT  
 This section begins with a discussion of what national managerial discretion is, and then 
advances a specific hypothesis on the moderating influence of national managerial discretion. 
Next, it looks at subsets of managerial discretion by investigating various dimensions of informal 
institutions and their moderating role in CEO’s influence on IPO performance in order to refine 
and extend our understanding.     
9.1 National Managerial Discretion 
 Managerial discretion is how much latitude a manager has to make decisions and how 
much management’s decisions actually influence the company’s operations (Finkelstein & Boyd, 
1998). Managerial discretion does vary across nations and cultures (Crossland & Hambrick, 
2011). Different institutional factors (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011), a region’s identity 
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(Molotch, Freudenburg, & Paulsen 2000), and societal perceptions influence the amount of 
managerial discretion in a particular region.  
Given that founder CEOs have imprinted their own personality on their business, they 
naturally possess the knowledge and skills to influence organizational actors in line with the 
firm’s goals. Indeed, the impact of founder CEOs in the United States has been shown to be 
stronger than non-founder CEOs in large corporations (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2009), 
small companies (Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008), and IPOs (Nelson, 2003). However, 
managerial discretion in the United States is high (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). Therefore, 
CEOs have more power to influence their firm and founders’ can more easily use their superior 
knowledge of their company to influence its performance. Moreover, CEOs that more embedded 
in their organization are better able to increase their company’s market performance by utilizing 
discretion. CEOs that owned a larger percentage of their company had a greater impact on their 
company’s market performance when managerial discretion was high (Lilienfeld-Toal & Ruenzi, 
2014). As mentioned previously, founders typically own a higher percentage of their firm than 
non-founders (Nelson, 2003) and are more likely to hold a significant portion (above 10%) of 
their company’s stock (Lilienfeld-Toal & Ruenzi, 2014). Founders not only have the ability to 
make decisions that best align with their company’s identity but are highly incentivized to do so.  
Managerial discretion gives CEOs power. CEOs that are given discretion via their 
national culture, can make more drastic decisions. Managerial discretion has been found to 
moderate many relationships between CEOs/CEO characteristics and decisions and performance 
outcomes. For instance, Li and Tang (2010) find that elements of managerial discretion moderate 
the relationship between CEO hubris and risk taking in organizations. This shows that 
managerial discretion allows CEOs’ personality traits to more strongly influence decision 
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making in their organization. In addition, Rabl, Jayasinghe, Gerhart, and Kahlmann (2014) found 
that elements of managerial discretion moderated the relationship between chosen human 
resource practices and firm performance. High performance work systems are more strongly 
related to business performance when managers have the discretion to properly implement them 
(Rabl et al., 2014). This shows that not only does managerial discretion allow for CEOs to make 
the decisions they want, but shows that making the same decisions can be more powerful when 
they have discretion.  
Difference in managerial discretion across multiple nations is particularly important in 
determining a CEO’s influence on their firm. Crossland and Chen (2013) found that in nations 
where managerial discretion is higher, CEOs are more likely to be dismissed for poor 
performance since important stakeholders believe that CEOs play a more integral role in 
influencing performance. Consequently, CEOs of IPO firms in nations with high managerial 
discretion will be perceived as more instrumental in determining their firm’s market 
performance. Given that founders have an even larger influence on their firm due to their level of 
ownership and the imprint of their personality on the business’ decisions, founder CEOs in 
higher discretion nations will have an even stronger relationship to their firm’s performance.  
Therefore, I hypothesize the following relationship:    
Hypothesis 1: National managerial discretion will positively moderate the 
founder CEO-IPO performance relationship.   
 
9.2 Contingent Influence of Informal Institutions 
 On a national level, informal institutions are also largely influential on the relationship 
between CEO’s decisions and firm performance. As noted above, managerial discretion is the 
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latitude that a manager has in making decisions (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). Constraint of 
discretion is determined by powerful stakeholders. Stakeholders determine which actions are 
acceptable or not based off of societal norms that are influenced by informal institutions such as 
culture and common practices (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). In this section, I will discuss three 
prominent informal institutions which previous literature suggests might influence this 
relationship (1) uncertainty avoidance (2) future orientation and (3) standard practice.  
Uncertainty avoidance, future orientation, and standard practice are three informal 
institutions that are particularly salient in determining the influence of founder CEOs. According 
to upper echelon theory, the background, tendencies, and personality of the manager impact the 
direction of the company. Founders and non-founder CEOs will frequently differ in specific 
tendencies they have given whether they went through the process of founding their company or 
not. Founders will differ in their ability to handle uncertainty since the entrepreneurial process 
requires a certain level of tolerance for change and ambiguity (Shane et al., 1995) that many 
hired managers have not had to face. Founders will differ in their propensity to be oriented 
towards the future since the entrepreneurial process is undertaken with the anticipation of a long 
term payoff (Das & Teng, 1997). A non-founder CEO may see their position with the company 
as a career stepping stone. CEOs that have prior executive experience take their firms to IPO 
earlier the company’s lifecycle (Yang et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, there is no significant relationship between the presence of a founder 
CEO and time to IPO (Yang et al., 2011). This shows that founders may be more concerned with 
the appropriate time to take their company public than quickly taking advantage of an 
opportunity like some experienced managers do. Lastly, founders in IPO companies increasingly 
become novelties in large developed market given the professionalization of management in such 
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markets. Whether a company subscribes to common institutional norms or not is a choice 
(Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006). Choosing to have a founder CEO to take an IPO to market is a 
choice to deviate from informal norms and makes founders’ unique relationship with their firm 
even more pronounced. Each informal institution will be discussed in more detail in the 
subsequent sections.   
 9.2.1 Uncertainty Avoidance.  Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which individuals 
tolerate ambiguity versus how much individuals prefer order (de Luque & Javidan, 2004). The 
event of an IPO is surrounded by a significant amount of uncertainty. Subsequently, making an 
IPO in a culture that is avoidant of uncertainty could be particularly challenging. However, 
countries that rate highly in uncertainty avoidance see much less underpricing in IPOs (Costa et 
al., 2013). Less underpricing in uncertainty avoidant cultures signifies that parties on both sides 
(within the organization and outside the organization) are both looking for the IPO process to 
involve less uncertainty. Countries that embrace uncertainty more have to deal with more 
ambiguity in the IPO process. Consequently, low uncertainty avoidant cultures will value 
founder CEOs more highly since embracing ambiguity is a particular skill acquired by founders 
during the entrepreneurial process.  
A theoretical construct encompassed in upper echelon theory is human capital of top 
management team members (Carpenter et al., 2004). Going through the entrepreneurial process 
of starting a company from scratch influences how a founder CEO behaves and perceives 
situations and adds to their human capital. Founders and their entrepreneurial teams learn skills 
that are both simple and complex that shape their future decision making capabilities (Hsu, 
2007). Participating in the entrepreneurial process also requires tolerance of uncertainty and 
unanticipated changes (Shane et al., 1995; de Luque & Javidan, 2004). Mueller and Thomas 
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(2001) found that individual entrepreneurial orientation (being both innovative and having a high 
internal locus of control) was more significant in low uncertainty avoidance cultures than high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures. Therefore, founders, who have successfully gone through the 
entrepreneurial process, will be able to tolerate uncertainty to a larger extent than those who have 
not experienced the entrepreneurial process.  
Tolerance of uncertainty is an element of human capital that can useful for when 
undergoing an event wrought with uncertainty such as an IPO. As mentioned previously, 
countries that have low uncertainty avoidance experience more underpricing (Costa et al., 2013) 
and stakeholders internal and external to IPO firms experience more ambiguity. Given the added 
amount of uncertainty within the IPO process in these nations, investors will see a manager who 
has the appropriate human capital to handle uncertain situations in a positive light. In line with 
this argument, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: The extent of uncertainty avoidance in the national culture will 
negatively moderate the founder CEO-IPO performance relationship. 
 
9.2.2 Future orientation.  This informal institution is the “degree by which a collectivity 
encourages and rewards future-oriented behaviors such as planning and delaying gratification” 
(Ashkanasy, Gupta, Mayfield, & Trevor-Roberts, 2004: 284). In the IPO process, companies that 
are future oriented are more interested in raising the amount of capital to benefit the company’s 
growth objectives (Costa et al., 2013). In fact, in high future-oriented cultures, less investors flip 
IPO shares for short term gains causing an underpricing effect (Costa et al., 2013). However, in 
many markets it has been shown that underpricing is not correlated to long-run performance of 
IPO firms (e.g. Lee, Taylor, & Walter, 1996). A way that future-oriented investors can decide 
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whether an IPO aligns with their interests is based on who the top management team is. A 
management team that is seen as appropriate to run a IPO company is shown to send a signal to 
investors about the attractiveness of the firm (Cohen & Dean, 2005).  
Markets embedded in future oriented cultures are going to be interested in investing in 
CEOs that they also believe care about the long run of the firm. CEOs play an integral role in the 
IPO process and given limited time and information to make decisions, their background and 
experience will play a large part in what kinds of decisions they make at the time of IPO that are 
either short or long term oriented (Andrews & Welbourne, 2000). Founders, given their 
experience as entrepreneurs and having to engage in risk behavior that involves taking 
considerable gambles for the possibility of long-term payoff (Das & Teng, 1997), tend to be 
more future-oriented than non-founder CEOs.  
Founder CEOs maintain their future orientation even when managing a publicly traded 
company for a long period time.  Fahlenbrach (2009) found in a sample of large United States 
companies in the S&P 500 that founder CEOs have a longer planning horizon and make 
investment decisions in line with maximizing shareholder value over time and not empire-
building. Founders have been shown to have a positive influence on long-term performance 
measures in IPO firms including survival (He, 2008) and for five year buy-and-hold returns (Gao 
& Jain, 2011) in United States’ samples. Founder CEOs naturally identify with the business they 
have created. The identity of the founder becomes “imprinted” on the business through important 
decisions made by the founder since inception (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011).  
Moreover, founder CEOs tie more of their wealth into the company by having a higher 
level of ownership than non-founders at IPO (Nelson, 2003). Intuitively, founders also are more 
likely to create entrepreneurial orientation in their company (Mousa & Wales, 2012). 
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Entrepreneurial orientation, involves a company being autonomous, innovative, proactive, 
competitively aggressive, and willing to take risks (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). The results of 
entrepreneurial orientation are not always evident immediately. Founder CEOs who have 
personally invested financially and psychologically into their own venture and have managed to 
remain with their company through the IPO process, are likely to care about what happens to the 
company in the long term. Therefore, investors in cultures that value future orientation, may 
value future-oriented founder CEOs more so than hired managers and will invest in IPOs 
accordingly. Although non-founder CEOs may have more experience in managing publicly-
traded companies, there is always a risk that they do not have the company’s and the 
shareholders’ best interest at heart. Therefore, investors will value founder CEOs more the more 
future orientation is valued in their society. Given the above argument, future orientation of an 
exchange will positively moderate founder CEO’s positive performance in IPOs.  
Hypothesis 2b: The extent of future orientation in the national culture will 
positively moderate the founder CEO-IPO performance relationship. 
 
9.2.3 Standard Practice.   Standard practice is when a company has a particular 
characteristic or behaves in a certain way that the majority of other firms in the particular context 
do. Organizations that retain the founder as their CEO through the IPO process are going against 
standard practice since the majority of IPO companies do not have the original founder at the 
helm when they make an IPO (Martens, 2005). As organizations grow, it is possible that the 
management expertise needed to run the company effectively changes (Jain & Tabak, 2008). 
Indeed, particular events in a company’s progression such as securing a round of financing 
motivates CEO succession (Wasserman, 2003).  However, certain companies do retain founder 
47 
 
CEOs given their unique human capital and ability to run the firm in which they created. 
Therefore, in this case, having a founder CEO during the IPO process is going against the 
standard practice of the market.  
Whether to conform or deviate from societal norms is ultimately a choice that 
organizations make (Gelfand et al., 2006). Management literature over the past quarter of a 
century has been particularly interested in the role of CEOs and management team’s role in the 
IPO process and in IPO performance (Certo, Holmes, & Holcomb, 2007). Different stakeholders 
are involved in making the decision about who is going to be at the helm during an IPO. Upper 
echelon theory states that managers make decisions based off of what information falls within 
their cognitive capabilities (Seaton & Boyd, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Whether or not 
the cognitive capabilities and experiences are in line with the projected path of a company 
making an IPO is a decision made by stakeholders. Jain and Tabak (2008) find that factors 
influencing founders’ cognitive processes including their functional background (output-based 
versus throughput-based), their age, founding team size, and the structure of the board of 
directors, determine whether they remain with their company through IPO.  
When both important external stakeholders and the CEOs themselves believe that the 
CEO’s experiences have prepared them to lead a company making an IPO the founder is more 
likely to remain the company (Jain & Tabak, 2008). A CEO that has an output-based functional 
background, involvement in marketing, merchandising, product research and development, and 
so forth, will more likely define problems, process information, and make decisions in a way that 
better handles uncertainty and ambiguity than a manager with a through-put background 
(Herrmann & Datta, 2005).  Being able to handle ambiguity is seen as a useful skill when 
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undergoing an IPO. However, the decision to have a founder in charge during IPO is not the 
most popular decision.  
Founder CEOs have been shown to bring beneficial experience to the IPO companies 
they manage. The various challenges founders have to face and overcome on their route to 
managing an IPO company can make it difficult for them to remain with their firm during IPO. 
Over the past 35 years (1980 through 2015) in the United States, the average age of a company 
making an IPO was 8 years old (Ritter, 2016). Between the 1990s and the 2000s in the United 
States, firm age at IPO has gotten larger (Ritter, 2016). During the similar time periods in the 
other markets, the average age was older. In London, the average age of an IPO company was 17 
in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (Paleari, Piazzalunga, Redondi, Trabucchi, & Vismara, 2009) and 
in the 1990s in Hong Kong, the average age of IPO firms was 16 years (Carey & Steen, 2006). 
Given the time taken to get to the offering stage and the continual professionalization of 
management, founder CEOs have become less popular of a choice in IPO companies. Therefore, 
the founders that do make it to the IPO stage are not only equipped with a unique set of firm-
specific human capital, but are battle-tested. Conflicting with standard practice can be 
advantageous for a company since it shows an element of uniqueness in the eyes of investors.  
As noted previously, companies managed by founders are an extension of the founder and their 
background (Gedajlovic et al., 2004) which give founders the ability to influence organizational 
actors consistent with the company’s values. Being able for founders to understand their firm so 
intimately will stand out even more against a backdrop of a large portion of firms managed by 
non-founder CEOs. Founders that standout in their market will be of more interest to investors 
and perform even better in the long run after IPO.  
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Hypothesis 2c: Standard practice will negatively moderate the founder CEO-IPO 
performance relationship. 
 
10. METHODS 
10.1 Sample 
 Ten exchanges in nine countries were selected from the World Federation of Exchanges 
that had a minimum of 15 IPOs between 2009 and 2011 and at least 5% of the IPOs were foreign 
listings. Nine countries exceed the minimum number of countries established by Franke and 
Richey (2010) to be able to draw reasonable conclusions in an international study. One country 
(Taiwan) had to be dropped from the dataset given the unavailability of a score for national 
managerial discretion. The years 2009, 2010, and 2011 were selected to avoid the 
macroeconomic issues of the global financial crisis of 2008 and provide three full years of data at 
the time of collection. All IPOs completed on each exchange was included in the sample except 
funds, corporate spin-offs, secondary offerings, and other offerings not representing a company 
going public for the first time (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003). Any firms that did not record 
at least one year on the market were also eliminated given lack of data. Firms that were acquired, 
delisted, merged with another company, or changed after one year of listing were included in the 
dataset for as long as they were listed as the company that made the IPO.  Descriptive statistics 
for each country included the dataset is included in Table 3.  
  
50 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Each Country Included 
 
  
Exchange MidCap Index No. of 
IPOs 
2009-2011 
Percentage 
Foreign 
Listings 
Percentage 
Founder 
CEOs 
Managerial 
Discretion 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Future 
Orientation 
Australian Securities 
Exchange 
S&P/ ASX Midcap 50 
Index 
226 6% 18% 5.7 4.39 4.09 
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange 
Deutsche Borse AG 
Midcap Indexx 
34 12% 21% 4.1 5.22 4.27 
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange 
Hang Seng Composite 
Midcap Index 
220 63% or 6%* 39% 5.0 4.32 4.03 
London Stock Exchange FTSE Smallcap Index 114 46% 25% 6.0 4.65 4.28 
New  York Stock 
Exchange/ NASDAQ 
S&P Midcap 400 
Index 
309 24% 39% 6.6 4.15 4.15 
Oslo Bors FTSE Norway Midcap 
Index 
19 32% 21% 5.2 4.31 4.48 
Singapore Exchange MSCI Singapore 
Midcap Index 
67 28% 36% 4.8 5.31 5.07 
Toronto Stock Exchange TSX Smallcap Index 50 12% 28% 5.9 4.58 4.44 
Total  1,039 27.88% 28.38%    
*For the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Chinese companies are listed as foreign listings. The first number is the total number of foreign 
listings that include Chinese companies and the second number is the total number of foreign listings that are not Chinese companies 
**Excludes Chinese firms that list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
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10.2 Dependent Variables 
IPO Performance. Following previous management and finance literature, IPO long-term 
stock market performance was measured using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) (e.g., 
Jaskiewicz, González, Menéndez, & Schiereck, 2005; Chang, Chung, & Lin, 2010). Two 
commonly utilized time periods, one year (e.g., Bhabra & Pettway, 2003) and three years of 
BHARs (e.g., Chang et al., 2010) are recorded. The performance and operations of IPO 
companies are generally different one year after the IPO and two or more years after IPO 
(Mikkelson, Partch, & Shah, 1997) and therefore, using more than one time period is useful. To 
adjust for market performance, the mid-cap index for each country is used. Mid-cap indices are 
the most appropriate benchmark for IPO companies since they contain firms of similar size and 
market-to-book ratio to the IPO companies on the market (Brav & Gompers, 1997; Jaskiewicz et 
al., 2005). Using a comparable sample for a benchmark has been shown to give more powerful 
and less biased results than using more general benchmark such as the S&P 500, FTSE 100, and 
Hang Seng Index, for example (Gao & Jain, 2011). All financial information to calculate BHARs 
were downloaded from a Bloomberg Terminal.  
10.3 Independent Variables 
Founder CEO Status Founder CEO status is recorded as a dichotomous variable coded as 
“1” if a company has a founder CEO and “0” if a company has a non-founder CEO (Nelson, 
2003; Jain & Tabak, 2008).  
Managerial Discretion Managerial discretion, the latitude a manager has to make 
decisions and how much management’s decisions actually influence the company’s operations 
(Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998), was measured via the scores provided by Crossland and Hambrick 
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(2011). Crossland and Hambrick (2011) used expert panelists to arrive at their managerial 
discretion scores for each nation.  
Uncertainty Avoidance Scores for uncertainty avoidance, the extent to which individuals 
tolerate ambiguity versus how much individuals prefer order (de Luque & Javidan, 2004), were 
obtained from the GLOBE study (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dofrman, Gupta, 2004). The GLOBE 
study (House et al., 2004) surveys the perception of individuals about their cultural viewpoints 
across 64 nations. The “as is” measure of society, which captures how people believe people 
behave in their society right now, was used (House et al., 2004).  
Future Orientation Scores for future orientation, the “degree by which a collectivity 
encourages and rewards future-oriented behaviors such as planning and delaying gratification” 
(Ashkanasy et al., 2004: 284), were also taken from the GLOBE study and the “as is” component 
of the measure.  
Standard Practice Standard practice, when a company has a particular characteristic or 
behaves in a certain way that the majority of other firms in the particular context do, is how 
common founder CEOs are in a nation in this context. Standard practice is measured by the 
percentage of firms in the IPO sample that have founder CEOs. As seen in Table 3, percentage of 
founder CEOs in a country range from 18% in Australia to 39% in the United States and in Hong 
Kong.  
10.4 Control Variables  
Firm Size Firm size is measured by the natural log of the number of employees for each 
firm at time of IPO (Kroll, Walters, Le, 2007). This data was downloaded from a Bloomberg 
terminal. Any missing data was obtained from official company statements (i.e., the company 
prospectus).  
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Venture Capital and Private Equity Backing Given that private equity and venture capital 
backing varies across nations and can impact IPO performance in some nations such as the 
United States (Brav & Gompers, 1997), it was controlled for using a dichotomous variable. A 
“1” was recorded for a company that had private equity or venture capital funding and “0” for 
each company that did not have backing from either private equity or a venture capitalist.  
CEO Tenure CEO tenure is controlled for by recording the number of years and months in 
decimal form that a CEO has been in their position at the time of the IPO. Controlling for CEO 
tenure separates the founder effect from firm-specific capital a CEO may have acquired from a 
long tenure.  
Firm Age Firm age is controlled for by recording the number of years and months in 
decimal form the company has been in operation since founding at the time of IPO.  
Industry Industry was controlled for by the first digit of the SIC code.   
CEO Entrepreneurial Experience Prior entrepreneurial experience of the CEO, whether they are 
the founder or not, is noted as “1” if the CEO has successfully started a business and “0” 
otherwise. Past experience was recorded from the CEO’s profile on a Bloomberg Terminal. Prior 
entrepreneurial experience signifies that the CEO acquired a particular set of human capital 
(Ucbasran, Wright, & Westhead, 2003) and needs to be separated from the founder effect.  
Formal Institutions When considering how informal institutions impact decisions at the 
national level such as culture, formal institutional factors need to be controlled for. Roughly 
following Crossland & Hambrick (2011), three formal institutions were controlled for including 
legal origin, labor market flexibility, and protection of minority shareholders. The formal 
institutional variable was recorded for the home country for each firm.  43 countries in total were 
represented in the dataset. Scores were taken from the World Economic Forum’s Global 
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Competitiveness Reports (2016) for each year. The Global Competitiveness Reports use an 
opinion survey from executives to assess the business environment as well as information from 
international agencies such as the United Nations (World Economic Forum, 2016). Legal origin 
was (denoted “1” if civil law and “0” if common law). Labor market flexibility was the sum of 
three categories that included (1) cooperation in labor-employer relations, (2) flexibility in wage 
determination, and (3) hiring and firing practices each scored from 1 to 7. Protection of minority 
shareholders was also recorded on scale from 1 to 7.  
10.5 Analysis 
 Given the nested nature of the data, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) was utilized for 
analysis. Given the skewed nature of the dependent variable of BHARs the variable was 
transformed by adding a constant and taking the log. Furthermore, five extreme outliers were 
removed from the dataset after an outlier analysis identified them as problematic. Level 2 
(country level variance) was significant and explained between 2% and 18% of firm performance 
which is consistent with other studies that compare IPOs across nations (e.g. Engelen & van 
Essen, 2010).   
 
11. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Bivariate correlations are presented in Table 4. Table 5 shows the means and descriptive 
statistics for control and dependent variables broken down by country in the dataset. Table 6 
shows the results for Hypothesis 1 for one year of BHARs. The interaction between founder 
CEO presence and managerial discretion is significant (F= -.058; p < .05), but in the opposite 
direction hypothesized. The coefficient is negative and therefore, founder CEO presence is 
negatively related to market performance the greater the discretion the CEO has in the country. 
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Notably, three control variables, including CEO entrepreneurial experience, foreign listings, and 
firm size are all significant which suggests that there might be an interactive effect that theory 
has not yet predicted. Larger firms, domestic firms, and firms with CEOs that have previous 
entrepreneurship experience perform better on average. For BHARs after three years, the 
interaction is not significant as shown in Table 7. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not supported by 
our data.   
 The results for Hypothesis 2 are included in Table 8 and 9. For uncertainty avoidance, the 
interaction is moderately significant in the opposite direction hypothesized (F = .110; p <.10). 
The presence of a founder CEO more significantly impacts market performance the higher the 
country scores in uncertainty avoidance. For three years of BHARs, the interaction is not 
significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a is not empirically supported, but this significant finding is 
interesting and will be explored further in the discussion section.   
For future orientation, the interaction is not significant for either one or three years of 
market performance. Hypothesis 2b, which states that founder CEO presence would be more 
significantly related to market performance for an IPO firm the higher the future-orientation of 
the exchange was not supported.  
Hypothesis 2c, which predicted that the larger the standard practice, the more negatively 
related founder CEO presence to market performance was supported for one year of market 
performance (F = -.005; p < .005) but not three years. The coefficient is negative for the 
interaction which shows that the lower the percentage of founder CEOs at the helm of IPO firms 
in the particular country for the years included, the more positively the founders that are CEOs 
perform. Firm size is shown to be significant for one and three years. In year one, entrepreneurial 
experience of the CEO is significant, while CEO tenure is significant after three years. As far as 
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the formal institutional controls, in year one common law origin is significantly related to 
performance of the IPO company while labor market flexibility becomes more important after 
three years.  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
1. CEO Entre Exp .16 .37                
2. Dom/For .30 .46 .04               
3. CEO Tenure 4.65 6.95 -.01 .04              
4. Firm Age 15.05 23.47 -.10 -.02 .10             
5. Firm Size 5.44 2.58 -.07 
 
.31 .18 .24            
6. VC/PE .25 .43 .03 .13 
 
.16 
 
.07 .36           
7. Legal Origin .30 .46 0 .66 .04 .04 .40 .12          
8. Labor Market 
Flexibility 
14.67 1.82 -.04 -.21 .09 .02 .18 .07 -.39         
9. Shareholder 
Protection 
4.94 .42 -.01 -.59 -.07 .01 -.41 -.30 -.59 .14        
10. Founder CEO .31 .46 .22 .11 .24 -.13 .09 .18 .09 .08 -.12       
11. Managerial 
Discretion 
5.74 .70 .08 
 
-.16 .06 -.01 -.10 .25 -.37 .06 -.08 .04      
12. Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
4.42 .32 -.04 -.02 -.05 .03 -.09 -.25 .06 .01 .33 -.05 -.62     
13. Future Orien 4.20 .25 .02 -.05 .02 .05 -.07 -.08 -.11 .26 .34 .02 -.23 .79    
14. Std Pract 30.72 9.27 .05 .27 .16 .13 .46 .42 .13 .51 -.44 .20 .16 -.27 .07   
15. BHAR 1 Yr 
(ln) 
5.27 .28 .03 -.07 -.02 .03 .06 -.01 -.11 .02 .02 -.03 0 -.06 -.09 -.04  
16. BHAR 3 Yrs 
(ln) 
5.05 .50 -.03 .05 .08 .07 .20 .06 .04 .18 -.09 -.01 -.04 -.15 -.08 .19 .25 
Significant correlations are bolded 
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Table 5: Means Values by Stock Exchange 
 
Stock Exchange 
CEO 
Tenure 
Firm 
Age 
Number of  
Employees 
VC/PE 
Backing 
BHAR 1 
Year 
BHAR 3 
Years 
Australian Securities Exchange 2.08 7.67 248 1% 19.16% -45.37% 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange 4.86 35.15 1705 26% -11.25% -83.79% 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange 4.92 14.35 7977 28% 7.52% 15.97% 
London Stock Exchange 3.76 12.87 2030 6% 39.55% -14.53% 
New  York Stock Exchange/ 
NASDAQ 
6.22 19.80 4677 55% -4.53% -13.16% 
Oslo Bors 6.35 28.28 1285 0% -6.57% -18.94% 
Singapore Exchange 5.45 19.13 1024 12% -32.64% -30.34% 
Toronto Stock Exchange 2.81 3.20 766 14% 53.69% -8.73% 
  
59 
 
 
Table 6: HLM Results for Managerial Discretion Interaction for 1 Year BHAR 
Fixed Effect 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Controls 
Direct Effect- 
Founder 
Managerial 
Discretion 
Founder x 
Discretion 
Founder CEO 
 
 -.010 
 
.012 
Founder x Managerial Discretion 
   
-.058** 
Control Variables  
CEO Prior Entrepreneurship Experience   .039* .040*       .038 .040* 
Domestic/ Foreign Listing -.083**** -.082**** -.083**** -.080**** 
CEO Tenure .000 .000 -.001 .000 
Firm Age .000 .000 .000 .000 
Firm Size (Employees) .016**** .015**** .016**** .016**** 
VC/PE Backing .003 .003 .000 .002 
Level 2 Variables 
    Managerial Discretion 
  
0.036 0.035 
Random Effect Variance Component 
Level 2 effect, U   .00248**** .00248**** .00247**** .00275**** 
Level 1 effect, e .07746 .07753 .07942 .07717 
N=1011 *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<.001  
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Table 7: HLM Results for Managerial Discretion Interaction for 3 Year BHAR 
Fixed Effect 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Controls 
Direct Effect- 
Founder 
Managerial 
Discretion 
Founder x 
Discretion 
Founder CEO 
 
-.050 
 
-.060* 
Founder x Managerial Discretion 
   
.050 
Control Variables  
CEO Prior Entrepreneurship Experience -.012 .000 -.012 -.002 
Domestic/ Foreign Listing -.035 -.032 -.035 -.035 
CEO Tenure .004* .004** .004* .004** 
Firm Age .001 .000 .001* .001 
Firm Size (Employees) .027*** .027**** .027**** .027**** 
VC/PE Backing .001 .013 .008 .011 
Level 2 Variables 
    Managerial Discretion 
  
.120 .120 
Random Effect Variance Component 
Level 2 effect, U .05213 .0515**** .05223**** .05179**** 
Level 1 effect, e .22435 .2242 .22431 .2241 
N=1011 *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<.001  
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Table 8: HLM Results for Informal Institution Interactions for 1 Year BHAR 
Fixed Effect 
 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Controls 
Formal 
Institutions 
Direct Effect- 
Founder 
Informal 
Institutions 
Founder & UA 
Interaction 
Founder & FO 
Interaction 
Founder & Standard 
Practice Interaction 
Founder CEO 
  
-.003 -.003 .018 -.002 .018 
Founder x UA 
    
.110* 
  Founder x FO 
     
.009 
 Founder x SP 
      
-.005** 
Control Variables        
Legal Origin 
 
-.180**** -.180**** -.190**** -.180**** -.190**** -.190**** 
Labor Market Flexibility 
 
-.013 -.012 -.013 -.013 -.013 -.013 
Shareholder Protection 
 
-.070* -.062* -.060 -.058 -.060 -.062* 
CEO Entr Exp .039* .041* .042* .041* .042* .041* .041* 
Domestic/ Foreign -.083**** -.010 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.001 
CEO Tenure .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Firm Age .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Firm Size (Employees) .016**** .016**** .016**** .017**** .017**** .017**** .017**** 
VC/PE Backing .003 .002 .002 .000 .000 .000 .005 
Level 2 Variables 
       Standard Practice 
   
-.004 -.004 -.004 -.003 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
   
-.078 -.078 -.078 -.075 
Future Orientation 
   
-.013 -.012 -.012 -.014 
Random Effect Variance Component 
  Level 2 effect, U .00248**** .00233**** .00233**** .00119** .00118** .00118** .00118** 
Level 1 effect, e .07746 .07679 .07687 .07692 .07672 .07699 .07662 
N=1011 *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<.001 
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Table 9: HLM Results for Informal Institution Interactions for 3 Year BHAR 
Fixed Effect 
 
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Controls 
Formal 
Institutions 
Direct 
Effect- 
Founder 
Informal 
Institutions 
Founder & UA 
Interaction 
Founder & FO 
Interaction 
Founder & Standard 
Practice Interaction 
Founder CEO 
  
-.044 -.043 -.054 -.039 -.036 
Founder x UA 
    
-.056 
  Founder x FO 
     
.025 
 Founder x SP 
      
-.002 
Control Variables        
Legal Origin 
 
.084 .089 .091 .089 .091 .092 
Labor Market 
Flexibility 
 
.035* .035* .035* .035* .035* .035* 
Shareholder Protection 
 
.014 .013 .012 .010 .012 .011 
CEO Entr Exp -.012 -.001 .002 .000 -.001 .000 .000 
Domestic/ Foreign  -.035 -.023 -.023 -.025 -.025 -.025 -.030 
CEO Tenure .003* .004 .004* .004* .004* .004* .004* 
Firm Age .001 .001* .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
Firm Size (Employees) .027**** .025*** .025*** .025*** .025*** .025*** .025*** 
VC/PE Backing .010 .015 .019 .015 .015 .015 .017 
Level 2 Variables 
       Standard Practice 
   
.006 .006 .006 .006 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
   
-.530* -.530* -.530* -.530* 
Future Orientation 
   
.460 .460 .460 .460 
Random Effect Variance Component 
  Level 2 effect, U .05213**** .05202**** .05150**** .03353**** .03349**** .03353**** .03348**** 
Level 1 effect, e .22435 .22358 .22348 .22343 .22359 .22366 .22362 
N=1011 *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<.001 
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12. DISCUSSION 
 This study found that founder CEOs had more influence on one year IPO performance in 
countries that had less founder CEOs in IPO companies, had less managerial discretion, and 
rated higher in uncertainty avoidance. Management’s impact on IPO performance does vary 
across nations. A CEO’s personal and cultural values influence the organizational culture of the 
company they run (Giberson, Resick, Dickson, Mitchelson, Randall, & Clark, 2009). For 
instance, managers who are more open to experience tend to manage a less hierarchical 
organization (Giberson et al., 2009). It is important for an organization to have a CEO in place 
who is a good fit for their organizational goals. The “fit” of a CEO with the company is 
something that investors consider when evaluating IPO firms. In the context of the United States, 
it is often discussed why it is preferable for a company making an IPO to have a professional 
manager to understand and appropriately deal with the challenges of a publicly-traded firm 
(Moore, Filatotchev, Bell, & Rasheed, 2012).  
However, a professional manager may not be the best “fit” for all IPO companies. IPO 
firms are typically judged on their potential and not raw accounting measures.  For instance, 
biotechnology companies that make IPOs create the most value by investing in research and 
development more intensely when they make their offer (Deeds, 2001). Showing long term 
potential and growth is showing investors that the IPO company is entrepreneurial. Having an 
entrepreneurial CEO such as a founder CEO can fit the objective of a growth-oriented IPO 
company. However, investors across different cultural contexts value such fit differently.  
 Countries that allow for less managerial discretion actually value founder CEOs more. It 
is possible that founder CEOs are better able to exert control in environments where CEOs are 
just given less discretion. Nelson (2003) found that founders have more ownership and control 
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over certain governance mechanisms at IPO which then leads to better IPO performance. Being 
able to wield control, could be more valuable in an environment where such control is more 
difficult to attain. It was originally hypothesized that larger managerial discretion would allow 
founders the freedom to use their unique firm-specific capital to manage their organizations 
better. However, it is quite possible that founders are better able to mitigate low levels of 
discretion on a national level than non-founders given their unique abilities.  
Countries that are higher in uncertainty value founder CEOs more. Of the nations 
represented in this study, Singapore, Germany, and London have the highest uncertainty 
avoidance scores. Singapore, which has the highest uncertainty avoidance score of 5.31, is a 
market of particular interest in this dataset. Even though Costa et al. (2013) found that countries 
with high uncertainty avoidance have less underpricing, Singapore has been shown to have 
historically high levels of underpricing (Singh & Van der Zahn, 2007). Singaporean IPOs still 
have underperformance issues even after one and three years as evident from the data in Table 3. 
Even though Singapore is a country that largely avoids uncertainty, much of their IPO market is 
dependent upon technology companies that rely primarily on intangible resources such as 
intellectual capital (Singh & Van der Zahn, 2007). Given the large portion of technology-related 
IPOs, founders in the Singaporean context could be seen as the best managers of the intellectual 
capital of the firms they have created. Therefore, in a way, a founder CEO represents less 
complications and uncertainty in the IPO stage given their close connection with their firm. In 
the IPO market in the United Kingdom, Moore et al. (2012) note that the market emphasizes 
more compliance with informal codes and are more reliant on social networks than in the market 
in the United States. Founder CEOs, who have achieved many network connections throughout 
their entrepreneurial journey, are seen as an advantage as a CEO (Moore et al., 2012). The 
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United States, given the level of uncertainty accepted in society, more formal restrictions need to 
be put in place during a big event such as an IPO as compared to places that control uncertainty 
through informal constraints. Entrepreneurs, who are more network-embedded in the United 
Kingdom, may reduce uncertainty in the eyes of investors since their social capital may be seen 
as stronger than a member hired from outside the firm. The social capital acquired by founders 
prior to IPO enable them to gather more resources outside their organization and use them 
collaboratively (Shiplov & Danis, 2006) which can be valued in the United Kingdom market.  
This study originally hypothesized that markets that were less uncertainty avoidant would 
value founder CEOs more highly since founders are less uncertainty avoidant than non-founder 
CEOs and align with market cultural values. Given that the results were found in the opposite 
direction; it is possible that certain characteristics of founders such as their network connections 
in the United Kingdom and their ability to manage intellectual capital in Singapore will make 
them more attractive to investors who shy away from uncertainty. It is also possible that in 
environments where uncertainty avoidance is higher, founder CEOs that can handle uncertainty 
may be a welcome change. It has been found in China that founder CEOs do take more risks than 
hired managers (Tang, Li, & Liu, 2016). China is traditionally a country that loads high in 
uncertainty avoidance, and the risk taking level of founders will seem more pronounced against 
the backdrop of a culture that is generally conservative.  
Lastly, when a founder CEO is less common in an environment, they stand out more. 
Founder CEOs who have unique firm-specific capital and who have been battle-tested stand out 
in markets where they are rarer. For a resource to be strategically valuable it must be valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and exploitable (Barney, 1991). Experience at the management level can be a 
firm’s strategic resource (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2000). It has been shown that many 
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of founder’s specific characteristics have shown to be valuable in multiple contexts (Colombo & 
Grilli, 2005). There is no other individual that can completely imitate the founder of a company.  
Founders that remain with their companies through IPO have also shown stakeholders that they 
can exploit their particular human capital in a meaningful way. This study shows that increasing 
the rarity of founders, increases their value on the stock market.  
12.1 Theoretical Implications 
 This study contributes to two growing streams of literature. First, what constitutes the 
“best” manager or leader in a particular context is culturally dependent. A growing body of 
literature has investigated which elements of culture influence which managers are viewed 
favorably. As previously mentioned, the perception of management and what makes a good 
leader is dependent upon culture norms (Matsuda et al., 1994; Brodbeck et al., 2000). There has 
been a large decline in research that seeks for universal leadership values (Dickson, Den Hartog, 
& Mitchelson, 2003) and scholars are trying to get a better picture of all the factors that influence 
valued traits across different cultural contexts. Understanding how different CEOs in IPO firms 
match with market preferences helps contribute to the contextual differences in leadership 
preferences. Given the key findings, this study shows that not all CEOs are valued based on how 
well they align with prevailing cultural values. Entrepreneurs, who are typically able to handle 
uncertainty better than hired managers, are actually more valued in uncertainty avoidant cultures. 
Founder CEOs, who are more likely able to wield discretion over their firm, are also more valued 
in countries where managerial discretion is lower. Lastly, founder CEOs in IPO firms are more 
valued in countries where they are rarer. Given these findings, there are contexts where cultural 
norms have the opposite effect on desired management traits. 
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 Second, this study contributes to the emergent literature on upper echelons across 
national contexts. After Hambrick and Mason (1984) popularized upper echelon theory, most of 
the research on management’s impact on firm performance was within the United States 
(Hambrick, 2007) where management is given a high level of discretion compared to other 
countries (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). A more global perspective is being developed in how 
management impacts firm behavior in recent studies. Elenkov and Manev (2005) show that 
sociocultural context is indeed a moderator between management influence and firm behavior 
across 12 European countries. Additionally, Guiterrez, Spencer, & Zhu (2012) found that 
managers in the United States, India, and China used different methods to effectively influence 
organizational members. Moreover, Flatten, Adams, and Brettel (2015) found that elements of 
national culture moderate the relationship between leadership style and absorptive capacity. 
Flatten et al. (2015) also had a finding in the reverse to what they predicted for moderation of 
uncertainty avoidance. Countries that are higher in uncertainty avoidance saw an increased 
relationship between transformational leadership and realized absorptive capacity. Given that 
founders are also valued more in IPO companies in uncertainty avoidant cultures, it is possible 
that stronger characteristics (founder status or being a transformational leader) are more powerful 
in environments made more challenging by uncertainty avoidance. Looking at management’s 
influence on IPOs has largely been conducted in single nation studies and this study adds that 
market preferences for CEO characteristics in IPOs varies across countries based off of 
uncertainty avoidance, managerial discretion, and standard practice.  
12.2 Practical Implications 
 When a company is considering making an IPO Ernest & Young (2013) suggests a 
company answers the question of “how do I prepare properly for the IPO transaction, cultivate 
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worthy investment in a dynamic market and steer my business to success as a public entity?” (pp. 
2). Understanding executive leadership preferences in a market can help a company be seen as a 
valuable. Given that stock markets are continually internationalizing and the importance of 
market timing, managers have numerous choices on when and where to go public. To optimize 
market performance in the long run, a company needs to maximize their perceived value in the 
eyes of investors. This study shows that choosing whether to have a founder CEO or a hired 
manager can make a difference in the long-run performance of an IPO. It also shows that if a 
company already has a particular type of CEO (founder or non-founder), they can appropriately 
choose the market in which they can make an IPO to properly fund their growth in the long run.  
12.3 Study Limitations 
 The markets examined in this study were are all large, developed, international stock 
markets. Having similar sized and developed markets helped for comparability purposes but 
limited the generalizability of this study. There are some elements of developing economy 
capital markets that are similar to developed economies, but some elements that are different 
(Booth, Aivzazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001). Therefore, the relationship between 
who the CEO is and IPO performance could be considerably different in developing economies.  
 The moderating variable that did not produce any significant results was future 
orientation. Future orientation scores had the smallest variation between nations as evident in 
Table 3. Every country except Singapore loaded between 4.00 and 4.50. The small variation in 
the sample could have been responsible for the nonsignificant findings. Investigating countries 
that have significantly different scores for future orientation may result in different findings.  
12.4 Future Research 
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 The entrepreneurial experience of CEOs was found to be a significant indicator of 
performance for the first year of IPO performance. Given the needed balance between the logics 
of an established firm and an entrepreneurial firm, prior successful entrepreneurial experience of 
the CEO could be an interesting variable that contributes to achieving the balance between these 
two logics. Prior entrepreneurship experience has shown to be a determining factor in early 
venture performance (Stuart & Abetti, 1990) and it would be interesting to investigate how 
entrepreneurship experience plays a role in IPO performance. Having a founder and having a 
hired manager with prior entrepreneurship experience may be substitutable. Entrepreneurial 
experience in different kinds of ventures may also play a role in how successful a CEO is in the 
IPO process.  
 National institutional factors varied in their significance based off of the time period. 
Whether an IPO’s home country was of common or civil legal origin was largely significant in 
the first year of IPO performance (evident from Table 6). However, the legal origin difference 
did not play a factor in three-year performance of the IPO while labor market flexibility did. Just 
as Bell et al. (2014) found, protection of shareholders in the country of origin was positively 
associated with IPO success and performance in an intermediate term. However, for three years, 
this variable was not significant (as shown in Table 7). Therefore, it would be interesting to build 
on this literature stream by investigating what institutional variables matter in the long term 
compared to the short term. 
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